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EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE GUARANTEES FOR
CAPITAL STATE POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL:
CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT
Andrew Hammel*
I. INTRODUCTION
Flaws in America's death-penalty justice system have
received a great deal of attention lately. The steady trickle of
death row exonerations,' former Illinois Governor George
Ryan's blanket commutation of all Illinois death sentences,2 and
the eighty-five recommendations of the commission he created
have focused attention on the death-penalty process.3 Public
concern centers on high-profile, obvious breakdowns in the
death-penalty justice process: innocent inmates exonerated by
* Lovells Lecturer in Anglo-American Common Law, Heinrich-Heine Universitait,
DUsseldorf, Germany. The author would like to thank Professor David Dow of the
University of Houston Law Center and Professor Tom Sullivan of the William H. Bowen
School of Law of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock for sharp and insightful
critiques of an earlier draft of this piece. Of course, responsibility for the ideas in this
article, and for any remaining mistakes, rests solely with the author.
1. As of August 16, 2003, the Death Penalty Information Center listed 111 inmates as
having been released from death row on grounds of innocence since the resumption of
capital punishment in 1973. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence: Freed From Death
Row (available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did= 110) (accessed
Nov. 14, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter
Innocence].
2. See Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, Clemency for All: Ryan Commutes 164 Death
Sentences to Life Without Parole, Chi. Trib. I (Jan. 12, 2003) (reporting Illinois governor's
blanket commutation of all existing death sentences, and noting his description of Illinois's
capital punishment system as "an absolute embarrassment" and "a catastrophic failure").
3. Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, Report of the Commission on
Capital Punishment (2002) (available at http://www.idoc.state.il.usccp/ccp/reports
/commission-report /index. html) (accessed Nov. 14, 2003; copy on file with the Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter Ryan Commission Report].
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DNA, 4 sleeping-lawyer ineffectiveness claims,5 or misconduct
by prosecutors.6 The issues get attention because they are easy to
understand: Journalists can write about them for a general
audience.
Yet one weak link in the chain of "super due process" 7 that
is claimed to ensure reliable death sentences has received
comparatively little public attention. Incompetent habeas corpus
representation occurs all too frequently in death-penalty
appeals--especially in Southern states, which are less than eager
to spend public funds to ensure adequate representation to
indigent inmates. The issue of incompetent habeas
representation is not one for the masses: Understanding the vital
role post-conviction plays, and the arcane rules that control it,
takes legal training.
However, post-conviction proceedings are, after trial,
perhaps the most common and effective means of forestalling
substantive injustice in capital cases. The American Bar
Association, in its recently updated Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases,8 observes that post-conviction claims are generally driven
not by issues the layman might call "technicalities" but by
information concealed by the state, . . . witnesses who did
not appear at trial or who testified falsely, [inadequate
investigation by the original] trial attorney, . . . new
4. See Innocence, supra n. 1, at 6 (noting that twelve death-row exonerations have
been based on DNA evidence).
5. See Lisa Teachey, Convicted Killer Avoids Death Row, Hous. Chron. A29 (June 20,
2003) (reporting that former death row inmate Calvin Jerold Burdine, who had won a new
trial because his original trial counsel had slept through portions of his Harris County,
Texas, death-penalty trial, had avoided a second trial by pleading guilty to a variety of
offenses).
6. See e.g. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor; How
Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win, Chi. Trib. Al (Jan. 10, 1999) (reporting results of
study that found 381 cases of homicide convictions tainted by prosecutorial misconduct,
including sixty-seven death-row cases).
7. "Super due process" refers to the network of enhanced procedural protections that
is intended to ensure heightened reliability in death-penalty trials. See generally Margaret
Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1143 (1980).
8. See ABA, ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 913 (2003) [hereinafter ABA
Guidelines].
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developments [that] show the inadequacies of prior forensic
evidence,. . . [and] juror misconduct.9
The importance of competent counsel in these critical appeals is
growing. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area,
coupled with recent reforms such as the AEDPA' ° and changes
in state post-conviction laws, have removed the already-tattered
safety nets hanging below post-conviction litigators. A state
post-conviction lawyer must now discover and present all
potential claims in the first habeas corpus petition or waive them
forever. These recent changes place an incalculable premium on
competent representation by talented, adequately funded
lawyers.
By way of review, it is important to note that the Sixth
Amendment standard for effective assistance of counsel has
been construed by the Supreme Court to require provision of
competent, but not error-free, representation. The leading
decision, Strickland v. Washington," articulates a two-step
burden in establishing a constitutional violation. The party
challenging counsel's performance must first demonstrate that
the attorney performed deficiently and not as a result of an
objectively reasonable strategy or matter of tactics.'2 The
challenger must then demonstrate that but for counsel's
defective performance, there was a reasonable probability of a
different outcome in the proceeding.' 3
The Court's Strickland test has been applied to counsel's
performance at trial, including those cases resolved by guilty
plea,14 and to sentencing proceedings, 5  including capital
sentencing proceedings.' 6 The test also applies to representation
9. Id. at 1086 (Commentary to Guideline 10.15.1B).
10. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 effectively altered
federal habeas corpus and post-conviction practice by amending portions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2002) (available at http://uscode.house.gov) that create
remedies for constitutional violations occurring during the criminal-trial process in state
and federal proceedings, respectively.
I1. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
12. Id. at 668, 690-91.
13. Id. at 687-88, 694.
14. Hill v. Lockhart, 472 U.S. 52 (1986).
15. See Glover v. U.S., 531 U.S. 198 (2001).
16. Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).
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on direct appeal.'7 However, the Sixth Amendment guarantee
has been limited only to representation of the criminal defendant
in the trial and direct-appeal process. Because the Constitution
does not recognize any requirement for post-conviction
process,18 even for a defendant sentenced to death,' 9 the Court
has rejected the argument that counsel's ineffectiveness in
representing the defendant in post-conviction litigation
represents a constitutional violation.0 Consequently, the issues
of competence and effectiveness in post-conviction
representation on the state level are matters of state law, rather
than federal constitutional right.
This Article will first survey the steps that states are taking
to ensure that inmates actually receive high-quality
representation. The survey will show that state habeas regimes
can be divided into three categories. In the first are those that
both recognize a standard for effective assistance of counsel that
requires competent performance and that provide remedies for
ineffective performance by state post-conviction lawyers. In the
second are states that do not recognize a general right to
competent performance by appointed post-conviction counsel,
but that may provide relief in certain cases of manifest injustice.
In the third category are states that may pronounce standards for
appointed habeas counsel competency, but that offer no remedy
for poor performance. Texas, which has become a charnel-house
of constitutional protections, is the most prominent member of
this last group.
Next, I will assess the trends in guaranteeing competent
performance by state post-conviction counsel. The only
meaningful guarantee of competent performance, I will argue, is
the traditional remedy of oversight of an appointed lawyer's
performance. Although many states have taken this step, I will
argue that recent developments demonstrate no discernible
movement towards enforcing a guarantee of competent
17. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
18. Pa. v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987).
19. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
20. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991); see also Wainwright v. Torna,
455 U.S. 586 (1982) (holding no constitutional violation based on counsel's defective
performance in representation in state discretionary review proceeding following direct
appeal).
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performance where it is most desperately needed: the large
states of the Deep South that have collectively carried out the
overwhelming majority of post-Furman executions.2' Nor is
there any discernible doctrinal trend that would empower a
federal court to require these states to provide such a guarantee.
Next, I will assess two recent proposals for reform that have
lately attracted scholarly attention. I will finally propose a
potential reform that is conceivably politically workable in that
it can be portrayed as streamlining the death-penalty system:
collapsing post-conviction appeals and direct appeals into one
unified proceeding. I will then sketch out the consequences of
this move, using Idaho's existing combined-appeal system as an
example.
II. TRENDS IN STATE-LEVEL GUARANTEES
OF EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE.
A. Introduction
Every state now offers inmates some form of post-
conviction review.22  These review schemes go under a
bewildering variety of rubrics and have structures which are
"too diverse and protean for easy generalization." 23 However, at
the most general level, virtually all state post-conviction
schemes share the following characteristics:
9 They occur separately from, and often after, the prisoner's
direct appeal.
21. See NAACP Leg. Def. & Educ. Fund, Death Row USA: Summer 2003, at 9
(available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DEATHROWUSArecent.pdf) (accessed
Nov. 14, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) (reflecting that,
as of October 1, 2003, Texas had conducted more executions than any other state-a total
of 305, or 35.7% of the 842 executions carried out in the modern era of the death penalty-
and that Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Alabama, and
Arkansas were all in the top ten states with the most executions).
22. See ,enerally Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., State Post-Conviction Remedies and Relief
(Harrison Co. 1996 & Supp. 1999) (describing procedures available in the states to
adjudicate post-conviction claims).
23. See James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice &
Procedure vol. 1, § 6.1, 286 (4th ed., LEXIS L. Publg. 2001) (listing various names for
post-conviction remedies).
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* They permit the prisoner to develop extra-record evidence
through traditional fact-development techniques such as
expert consultation, discovery, depositions, and evidentiary
hearings.
* Generally, jurisdiction in state post-conviction is limited
to claims of a constitutional, rather than statutory,
dimension.
State post-conviction proceedings are governed by widely
varying procedural rules and restrictions. Although the scope
and force of these rules vary widely from state to state, they all
stem from a common decisional lineage and can be grouped into
general categories:
9 An inmate who could have raised a claim on direct appeal
(for instance, because all evidence necessary to decide the
claim was already present in the record) may not raise the
claim in post-conviction proceedings.24
e An inmate who already has raised a claim (either in a
previous post-conviction petition or on direct appeal) may
not raise the same claim again.
e An inmate who has already filed one state habeas corpus
petition and received an adjudication of it may not file
another petition unless he can demonstrate good cause for
bringing additional claims before the court. Cause generally
tracks the Supreme Court's definition of that term, which
requires a factor "external to the defense" (i.e.,
24. This rule is subject to caveats. First, it generally applies only when all the
information necessary to resolve the claim is present in the record of the trial. See Massaro
v. U.S., 123 S. Ct. 1690, 1694 (2003) (holding that defendants need not "exhaust" claims
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel by raising them on direct appeal because only post-
conviction proceedings allow such claims to be developed "on a... record developed
precisely for the object of litigating [and] preserving the claim"). Second, a defendant can
raise a claim that should have been raised during direct appeal proceedings but was not
raised if he also alleges that the failure to raise the claim constituted ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000).
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prosecutorial misconduct, or newly established law) that
excuses the failure to raise the claim earlier.
This last rule, generally known as a "successor bar," is the most
important for our purposes. Prisoners need some forum in which
to protest the ineffectiveness of a prior habeas attorney, but state
post-conviction proceedings are themselves the "end of the
line" of the state court appellate process. Therefore the proper
forum for such a claim, if it is to be recognized, is generally
assumed to be a successive habeas corpus application raising the
ineffectiveness of prior habeas counsel. In the next Part, I will
survey the current answers states have given to the question of
whether ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can be
"cause" for failing to properly raise a claim in a previous post-
conviction application.
B. Differing State Approaches
I will focus exclusively on the question of whether the state
in question actually guarantees competent performance by
appointed state post-conviction counsel. Although there are
other potential benchmarks for state performance in this area, I
believe, as I will argue later, that actual guarantees of competent
performance, coupled with remedies for their breach, are the
only realistic benchmark. Thus the focus of the following survey
will be on what steps states have taken to create procedurally
enforceable guarantees of actual competent performance on the
part of capital post-conviction counsel.
1. Full Guarantee
By "full guarantee," I mean states that confer upon inmates
a guarantee of effective performance of counsel that is
analogous to Strickland's general guarantee. That is, these states
guarantee that counsel must do more than simply show up in
court or file a document on time. The substance of their
representation must be competent. The states also provide some
procedure by which inmates can invoke the powers of the court
to review counsel's performance. States that offer this level of
protection are Alaska, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa,
Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and
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Wisconsin. The rationales for these decisions break down into
two broad categories. Some states base their decisions on state
constitutional grounds; others rely on principles of statutory
construction, or common sense, in concluding that statutes that
provide for counsel to represent offenders in state post-
conviction proceedings necessarily imply that counsel must be
effective.
The Connecticut Supreme Court's 1992 decision of Lozada
v. Warden25 deserves pride of place, since its forceful and vivid
language has had a considerable impact on later courts. In
Lozada, the court concluded that the Connecticut Legislature, in
providing for the appointment of counsel to inmates in post-
conviction proceedings, intended that they receive effective
assistance of counsel: "It would be absurd to have the right to
appointed counsel who is not also required to be competent,"
the court declared.26 The court mildly chided the State for
countering Lozada's argument: "Surely, fundamental fairness
opens the door for relief by habeas corpus when the state, in
discharging its statutory duty, appoints incompetent counsel." 27
An inmate who received ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel should file a successive habeas corpus
application and "must prove both (1) that his appointed habeas
counsel was ineffective, and (2) that his trial counsel was
ineffective." 8 The Connecticut Supreme Court later even
reversed the judgment of a lower court in order to guarahtee the
right of effective assistance of counsel on discretionary appeal
from a trial-court level denial of post-conviction relief.29
The Alaska Court of Appeals relied on the Due Process
clause of the Alaska Constitution to confer a guarantee of
effective post-conviction representation on that state's inmates.3°Because Alaska guarantees inmates the right to appointed
25. 613 A.2d 818 (Conn. 1992).
26. Id. at 821 (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 822.
28. Id. at 823. The court's formulation appears to be tailored to the facts of the case
before it, in which the underlying claim of constitutional error was a claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.
29. Gipson v. Commr. of Correction, 778 A.2d 121, 129-30 (Conn. 2001), reversing
Gipson v. Commr. of Correction, 735 A.2d 847 (Conn. App. 1999).
30. See Grinols v. State, 10 P.3d 600, 604 (Alaska App. 2000).
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counsel to file their initial state post-conviction applications,3'
the court reasoned, inmates are "entitled to expect that their
attorneys will provide competent representation" as a matter of
due process.32 To invoke his right to a subsequent state post-
conviction proceeding to litigate claims omitted or mishandled
during the first proceeding, an inmate must establish that
* he diligently and promptly raised the claim of ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel;
* his former post-conviction lawyer's representation fell
"below the acceptable minimum of skill expected of
criminal law practitioners";
* the legal issue overlooked owing to prior counsel's
incompetence was meritorious; and
e the error was harmful, i.e., that the "flaw in the prior post-
conviction relief proceeding prevented the defendant from
establishing a demonstrable and prejudicial flaw in the
original trial court proceedings."33
The court declined to provide court-appointed counsel to all
inmates to litigate their claims of ineffective representation by
prior post-conviction counsel, but it did authorize trial-court
judges to appoint state-paid counsel when "needed for a fair and
meaningful litigation of the defendant's claim." 
34
The Idaho courts took a somewhat different approach to the
question. In 1981, the Idaho Supreme Court held that an
inmate's failure to raise an issue in his original habeas
application could be excused. The court pointed to the language
of the governing habeas statute, which provided that any alleged
waiver of grounds for relief by an inmate must be made
"knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently." 35 The prisoner
alleged that his failure to raise a particular claim in his first post-
31. See Alaska Stat. § 18.85.100(c) (West 2003).
32. Grinols, 10 P.3d at 618.
33. Id. at 619-20.
34. See id. at 604.
35. Palmer v. Dermitt, 635 P.2d 955, 957 (Idaho 1981) (quoting Idaho Code § 19-908).
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conviction application was not done knowingly, but rather
because of the "ineffective assistance of his prior post-
conviction counsel." '36 The court reasoned,
The allegations of ineffective assistance of prior post-
conviction counsel, if true, would warrant a finding that the
omission in the prior post-conviction proceeding of the
allegations now being raised anew by Palmer was not a
result of an active, knowing choice made by Palmer
through this prior court-appointed attorney, and would
therefore provide sufficient reason for permitting the newly
asserted allegations-to be raised in the instant petition.37
In 1999, a lower Idaho court extended this reasoning to protect
an inmate whose prior post-conviction attorney had filed the
claim in question but had litigated it "inadequately." 38
Although Idaho's approach provides robust protection, it
rests on a thin reed. The knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver standard found in section 19-4908'9 was adopted in 1967,
and it appears to be explicitly modeled on language found in the
United States Supreme Court's 1963 decision in Fay v. Noia.4°
As any student of habeas knows, intervening Supreme Court
decisions have undermined Fay.4 Should the state legislature
choose to update its state post-conviction statute to reflect a
more contemporary understanding of procedural default
doctrine, the reasoning underpinning the Idaho courts'
41performance guarantee would be swept away.
36. Id. at 959.
37. Id. at 960.
38. Hernandez v. State, 992 P.2d 789, 793, 800 (Idaho App. 1999) (reversing lower
court's dismissal and remanding for consideration of petitioner's allegation that claim was
previously dismissed only because previous post-conviction attorney supported it only with
inadequate, conclusory allegations).
39. Idaho Code § 19-4908 (West 2003).
40. 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963) (holding that state post-conviction petitioner may not be
held to have procedurally defaulted a habeas claim unless, "after consultation with
competent counsel or otherwise, [he] understandingly and knowingly forewent the
privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts").
41. See e.g. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (overruling Fay in part,
establishing new "cause and prejudice" standard for reviewing state-court procedural
defaults, and holding that incompetent performance by appointed state post-conviction
counsel did not excuse procedural default).
42. The Idaho courts have rejected constitutionally based arguments in favor of a right
to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. See Hernandez, 992 P.2d at 793 n. 2
(collecting authorities).
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California has not explicitly attached a performance
guarantee to post-conviction representation, but it has
established precedent that appears to convey a full, guarantee of
competent performance and a remedy for its breach. In 1993, the
California Supreme Court, in a capital case, held that
"[r]egardless of whether a constitutional right to [post-
conviction] counsel exists, a petitioner who is represented by
counsel has a right to assume that counsel is competent and is• • • ,,43
presenting all potentially meritorious claims. The court
considers sufficiently serious errors or omissions on the part of a
death row inmate's court-appointed post-conviction lawyer as
good cause to permit exceptions to its rules requiring timely
filing of petitions" and barring successive petitions.
California is worthy of special consideration because,
unlike many states that simply declare that an inmate is entitled
to effective post-conviction representation, California has
actually attempted to define, in the context of capital cases, what
effective post-conviction representation actually entails. Policy 3
of the California Supreme Court, adopted in 1998, requires
capital habeas counsel to investigate "factual and legal
grounds" for potential habeas claims. 46 Habeas counsel is to
begin by consulting a list of potentially meritorious issues
compiled by appellate counsel and should continue by
discussing the case with "the defendant, trial counsel, and
appellate counsel. 4 7 Instead of performing an "unfocused
investigation having as its object all factual bases for a collateral
attack on the judgment," appointed counsel should "investigate
potential habeas corpus claims only if counsel has become
aware of information that might reasonably lead to actual facts
supporting a potentially meritorious claim."4 8
43. In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 748 (Cal. 1993).
44. See In re Sanders, 981 P.2d 1038, 1053-54 (Cal. 1999) (permitting inmate to file
untimely petition when untimeliness was product of former counsel's essentially
abandoning his client during the period for filing the petition).
45. See Clark, 855 P.2d at 748 ("If, therefore, counsel failed to afford adequate
representation in a prior habeas corpus application, that failure may be offered in
explanation and justification of the need to file another application." ).
46. See Sanders, 981 P.2d at 1052 n. 12 (quoting Supreme Court Policies Regarding
Cases Arising from Judgments of Death, Policy 3, Stds. 1-1 (1989, as amended 2/4/1998)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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New Jersey follows what is perhaps the most generous
post-conviction scheme. The New Jersey Supreme Court
recently described its "unique" approach to post-conviction
review:
In keeping with our view of the overarching importance of
providing defendants a final opportunity to raise
constitutional errors that could not have been raised on
direct appeal, our court rules, in an initiative unique among
our sister-jurisdictions, state that every defendant is entitled
to be represented by counsel on a first [post-conviction]
petition; that if a defendant is indigent, counsel will be
assigned; that assigned counsel may not withdraw based on
the ground of "lack of merit" of the petition; and that
"counsel should advance any grounds insisted on by the
defendant notwithstanding that counsel deems them
without merit." 
49
Thus, not only is New Jersey one of the very few states that
guarantee appointment of post-conviction counsel without a
preliminary screening of the merits of the petition, it also
provides a guarantee of counsel's performance that exceeds the
scope of the federal constitutional guarantee, in that it
guarantees counsel's help in presenting claims counsel believes
to be meritless. °
The Maryland Supreme Court, in 1997, held that inmates
who qualified for assistance from the public defender's office
were entitled to effective assistance of counsel.' The Maryland
court flatly rejected the State's argument that a statutory
entitlement to counsel should not entail a right to effective
assistance from that counsel, intoning that a right to a lawyer
would be "hollow indeed unless the assistance were required to
49. State v. Rue, 811 A.2d 425, 433 (N.J. 2002) (citing N.J. Sup. Ct. R. 3:22-6).
50. By contrast, the federal guarantee of effective appellate counsel permits attorneys
in criminal appellate proceedings to exercise their judgment by refusing to file even
meritorious claims, and to file so-called Anders briefs if they are convinced their client has
no meritorious claims. See e.g. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983) (while federal
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel applies to direct appeal proceedings, it does not
require appointed counsel to file and argue all meritorious claims, even if the client wishes
they be pursued); Anders v. Cal., 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (setting out procedure to be
used by appellate counsel in criminal cases in which appellate counsel is unable to discern
any meritorious claims of error arising from the client's trial).
51. State v. Flansburg, 694 A.2d 462,465 (Md. 1997).
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be effective."52 The court did not rely on an explicit
constitutional rationale, but rather simply assumed the
proposition as a matter of common sense.
Iowa relied on the same brisk approach in a 1994 case,
presenting a pr6cis of its former case law on the subject and
declaring that "once counsel was appointed to represent him,
[the petitioner] had a right to the effective assistance of
counsel." 53 The State urged the Iowa court to follow the then-
recent Supreme Court precedent of Coleman v. Thompson,54
which affirmed that the federal constitution contains no
guarantee of effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. The
court, however, observed that Coleman, whose reasoning was in
part founded on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
federal Constitution, was inapposite, because the right to
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel was not
constitutionally based in Iowa.
To ensure Iowa petitioners a remedy, the court ruled that
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel "constitutes
sufficient 'cause' . . . to [excuse a petitioner's failure to]
adequately raise an issue in prior proceedings." 5 To obtain
merits review of his claim, the petitioner must "state the specific
ways in which counsel's performance was inadequate and
identify how competent counsel representation would have
changed the outcome."5 6 Pennsylvania 7 and Wisconsin justify a
right to competent post-conviction counsel using a broadly
similar rationale.
58
The latest addition to the ranks of states that guarantee
effective performance is South Dakota. In Jackson v. Weber,59
the South Dakota Supreme Court observed that the last time it
52. Id. at 467 (quoting Wilson v. State, 399 A.2d 256, 260 (Md. 1979)).
53. Dunbarv. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994).
54. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
55. 515 N.W.2dat 15.
56. Id.
57. See Commonwealth v. Priovolos, 715 A.2d 420, 422 (Pa. 1998).
58. State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 556 N.W.2d 136, 139-40 (Wis. App. 1996).
Although the Rothering court declined to rule on the petitioner's claims of ineffective post-
conviction counsel, it declined to do so only for procedural reasons, and informed the
petitioner that he would be entitled to raise his claims of ineffective post-conviction
counsel in the trial court. Id. at 139 n. 6.
59. 637 N.W.2d 19 (S.D. 2001).
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had addressed the question, it had suggested that effectiveness of
post-conviction counsel was to be assessed under a due-process
standard less generous than Strickland.6 ° The court, however,
elected to disavow the former case and adopted Strickland as the
proper standard for determining whether post-conviction counsel
had performed effectively. The court quoted an Illinois court's
reasoning that the "legislature could not have intended to
provide an individual.., with the right to counsel and to permit
that counsel to be prejudicially ineffective."'" The court
recognized that its decision entailed that "more than one claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel may be brought on
occasion," while countering that any abusive litigation would be
controlled by the requirement that the claim be "eventually be
directed to error in the original trial or plea of guilty."62 In any
event, the court reasoned (ungrammatically quoting the
Connecticut Supreme Court's landmark decision in Lozada) that
"refusal to acknowledge that the requirement of counsel means
constitutionally effective counsel would weaken the habeas
mechanism to ensure 'as a bulwark against convictions that
violate fundamental fairness.""'63 A dissenter objected that the
policy of extending a guarantee of effectiveness to post-
conviction proceedings, while a "rational alternative," was
"constitutionally the sole prerogative of the Legislature" to
enact. 64
2. Limited Protection
A few states approach the issue on a case-by-case, ad hoc
basis. In extreme cases, they will recognize exceptions to their
previous successor-bar decisions or will read exceptions into
statutory successor bars and permit inmates a second hearing.
These exceptions, however, fall far short of generating any
generally applicable right to the effective assistance of counsel.
60. Id. at 22 (relying on Strickland).
61. Id. at 23 (quoting In re Carmody, 653 N.E.2d 977, 983 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1995)
(holding that statutory grant of counsel to persons challenging mental-health commitments
necessarily implied right to effective assistance of counsel)).
62. 637 N.W.2d at 23.
63. Id. (quoting Lozada v. Warden, 613 A.2d 818, 822 (Conn. 1992) and Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (emphasis in original)).
64. Id. at 26 (Gilbertson, J., dissenting).
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Rather, they are tailored to the facts of the case at hand and
generally provide relief only in extreme cases.
South Carolina is such a state. In Case v. State,65 a pro se
petitioner had filed a post-conviction petition which was
dismissed without a hearing on the basis that it lacked
"specificity." 66 He did not appeal. Almost two years after filing
his initial petition, he filed a successive petition which
apparently set out his claims more clearly. The court, after
"reviewing the entire record and considering the unique
combination of facts," granted Case a hearing on his second
writ, "despite its successiveness."67
In a pair of 1991 cases, the South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed indigent defendants' statutory right to counsel on
discretionary appeal from the trial-court-level denial of their
post-conviction writs. In Austin v. State,68 the appellant received
counsel's assistance during a trial court hearing, but counsel
later failed to seek discretionary appellate review of the trial
court's ruling. The appellant filed a subsequent post-conviction
petition "alleging only that his [previous] PCR counsel was
ineffective in failing to seek appellate review of the denial of
PCR." 69 The court acknowledged that there was no
constitutional right to counsel on discretionary review of a
denial of a PCR motion, but that an appellant was assured such a
right by statute.7° The court concluded that, to remedy
"unfairness," it would remand for a hearing into whether he had
requested that a petition for discretionary review be filed and
evaluate the claim under an ineffectiveness rubric if the hearing
revealed he "requested and was denied an opportunity to seek
appellate review." 7
The appellant was less fortunate in Aice v. State.,72 Aice had
a full round of post-conviction proceedings, culminating in a
65. 289 S.E.2d 413 (S.C. 1982).
66. Id. at 413.
67. Id at 413-414.
68. 409 S.E.2d 395 (S.C. 1991).
69. Id. at 396.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 409 S.E.2d 392 (S.C. 1991).
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discretionary appeal of the trial court's denial of relief.73 He then
filed a successive petition, claiming his first post-conviction
counsel had been ineffective for failing to raise three meritorious
issues.74 In this case, the South Carolina court demurred. It held
that any claim which "could have been raised" in a petitioner's
first habeas proceeding must be raised in that proceeding and
that any possible ineffectiveness of the first defense lawyer
would not justify a new habeas proceeding:
As long as a given convict's counsel could craft new
arguments not raised by prior PCR counsel, a successive
application could be heard, under Aice's view .... Finality
must be realized at some point in order to achieve a
semblance of effectiveness in dispensing justice. At some
juncture judicial review must stop, with only the very rarest
of exceptions, when the system has simply failed a
defendant and where to continue the defendant's
imprisonment without review would amount to a gross
miscarriage of justice.75
South Carolina thus illustrates what might be called the "ad hoc
protection" view of counsel performance guarantees. The state
supreme court evaluates allegations of post-conviction counsel's
incompetence on a case-by-case basis, determining whether, in
any particular case, the system has "failed" a defendant to the
extent that justice requires a remedy.
Alabama also illustrates this approach. The Alabama Court
of Criminal Appeals has squarely held that there is no
constitutional or statutory right to counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings.76 There is also no right to the assistance
of counsel preferred by the petitioner.7 7 Nevertheless, in a brief
paragraph in Gooch v. State, 8 the court observed that it had
73. Id. at 393.
74. Id. at 394.
75. Id. at 451.
76. See Mayes v. State, 563 So. 2d 38, 39 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). See also Ala. R.
Crim. P. 32.7(c) (providing counsel to post-conviction petitioners only when petition is not
suitable for summary dismissal, petitioner is indigent, and assistance of counsel is
"necessary to assert or protect the rights of the petitioner" ).
77. See Hamm v. State, 2002 WL 126990 at *6 (Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2002)
(approving replacement of Rule 32 petitioner's long-time counsel and holding that
petitioner "clearly had no right to counsel of his own choice").
78. 717 So. 2d 50 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).
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agreed to consider the petitioner's successive post-conviction
application because the first petition was "not heard on the
merits" and because the successive petition "raises the issue of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and is the first petition
filed by someone other than the appellant's trial counsel." 79 The
court provided no citations to support these brief conclusions
nor any argument reconciling its previous holdings with its
decision to hear Gooch's claim. However, the court suggests
that under circumstances amounting to an effective denial of
counsel, the Alabama court system will permit petitioners a
second bite at the appeal.
Also in this camp is Indiana. In 1989, the Indiana Supreme
Court refused to discern a guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel in the state or federal constitutions. 0 The court
accordingly declined to accord inmates any right to competent
post-conviction counsel. The court did, however, declare that
inmates had the right to counsel who, at the minimum, managed
to appear and perform:
We adopt the standard that if counsel in fact appeared and
represented the petitioner in a procedurally fair setting
which resulted in a judgment of the court, it is not
necessary to judge his performance by the rigorous
standard set out in [Strickland]."
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in Jackson v. State,
8 2
reviewed an order denying the petition for post-conviction relief
in a capital case as untimely filed. The untimely filing rested in
part on the trial court's failure to comply with a requirement for
appointment of second counsel when the original attorney could
demonstrate a potential conflict of interest based on prior
representation of the petitioner. In this circumstance, the
Arkansas court concluded that due process, a matter of
fundamental fairness, required that the petition be considered on
the merits.83 The court did not establish a broad right to effective
assistance of counsel in Jackson, and its decision might be read
79. Id. at 52.
80. See Baum v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1200, 1201 (Ind. 1989).
81. Id.
82. 37 S.W.3d 595, 597-98 (Ark. 2001).
83. Id. at 599. Jackson's petition was ultimately rejected on the merits. Jackson v.
State, 105 S.W.3d 352 (Ark. 2003).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
as limited to the peculiar facts of the case. Nevertheless, the
court did apply due process analysis to at least the failure of
counsel to perform a ministerial duty of timely filing," even
though review of counsel's performance in the litigation of a
post-conviction action is not so clearly contemplated in the
opinion.
3. No Protection
The states surveyed above at least temper their enforcement
of procedural bars in habeas proceedings to avoid unjustly harsh
outcomes85 or ensure that prisoners do not suffer by procedural
problems caused ultimately by the State's failure to appoint
competent counsel. The following states, however, decline to go
even this far.
a. No right to counsel
The first category of states that do not recognize the right to
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel are those that
recognize no right to post-conviction counsel at all, for any class
of inmates. There are currently two states in this category,
Georgia and Alabama. In 1999, the Georgia Supreme Court
held, in Gibson v. Turpin,86 that indigent Georgia habeas corpus
petitioners had no right to the appointment of counsel to assist
them in state habeas corpus post-conviction proceedings. The
court relied primarily on two lines of reasoning. First, borrowing
from the Supreme Court's analysis of criminal proceedings, the
Georgia court argued that because habeas corpus proceedings
are far removed in time and importance from the original
criminal trial, their reliability is of less importance to the state
and prisoner." The Georgia court also deployed the familiarargument that recognizing a right to effective assistance of post-
84. See also Porter v. State, 33 S.W.3d 73, 73 (Ark. 1999) (holding that counsel's
failure to comply with necessary filing rules required relief).
85. See In re Sanders, 981 P.2d 1038, 1054 (Cal. 1999) (excusing procedural default
caused by abandonment by former habeas counsel in order to avoid "incongruous" and
"harsh" result of forfeiting a habeas petitioner's claims without the habeas petitioner's
knowledge or consent, owing only to the actions of his court-appointed attorney).
86. 513 S.E.2d 186 (Ga. 1999).
87. Id. at 189-90.
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conviction counsel would give rise to an endless series of
appeals.88 Gibson attracted an unusual amount of attention
because the petitioner, Exzavious Gibson, had been required to
represent himself unaided by counsel during a post-conviction
evidentiary hearing. 89
b. Counsel provided by statute but need not perform
effectively
Most death-penalty states are in this category. They provide
for mandatory appointment of counsel to all death row inmates,
but they either do not provide any explicit guarantee of
competent performance, or they specifically disclaim any such
guarantee. Most states in this category arrived there by statutory
pronouncement, as will be discussed below.
Some states, however, have arrived there by court decision.
Nevada provides a statutory guarantee of, post-conviction
representation to capitally sentenced inmates. However, the
Nevada Supreme Court, in Bejarano v. Warden, ° overruled a
previous case and reached the "regrettable" conclusion that it
would not afford petitioner, a death row inmate, any guarantee
of effective performance of post-conviction counsel. 9' The court
again relied on the endless-appeals argument: " [I]f counsel for
post-conviction proceedings, as well as trial and direct appeal,
must meet the same standards, then claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel in the immediate prior proceedings may be
raised ad infinitum." 
92
Clearly the most restrictive state in the "no-protection"
category is Texas, where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
has determined that death row inmates are not entitled to
competent performance by appointed post-conviction counsel,
even though Texas law specifically guarantees that death row
inmates will be represented by "competent" counsel. In 1995,
the legislature added a new provision, Article 11.071, to the
88. Id. at 191.
89. See e.g. Bob Herbert, The Hanging Tree, 146 N.Y. Times A17 (Jan. 6, 1997)
(describing Gibson's hearing).
90. 929 P.2d 922 (Nev. 1996).
91. Id. at 925.
92. Id.
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Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The new law established a
specialized framework for capital post-conviction appeals, and
guaranteed all death row inmates who desired representation the
appointment of "competent" counsel who would
"expeditiously" investigate the factual and legal grounds for
habeas claims.93 The legislation charged the court with adopting
"rules" and standards ensuring competent counsel. 94-Because
Texas does not have a statewide public defender system, the
court recruited attorneys from private practice to represent the
State's death row population, then nearing 500 prisoners.95 The
court never explained what standards it was using to evaluate the
appointed lawyers, appointing several lawyers with limited or no
capital experience.
6
Pressure for the Court of Criminal Appeals to define what
constituted "competent" counsel grew with evidence that the
court had tolerated instances of apparent incompetent
performance. For instance, the court refused to address the
merits of several habeas petitions that had been filed late by
court-appointed counsel.9 The court also, over dissenters'
protests, refused to investigate whether the extremely brief and
superficial habeas applications being filed by many court-
appointed counsel were a sign of ineffective performance. 9'
Federal courts, assigned to review the work of court-appointed
state post-conviction counsel, joined in the chorus of criticism."
Finally, in 2002, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed to
93. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.071 § 2(d), 3(a) (West 2003). Article 11.071
applies only to capital cases. In non-capital cases, appointment of counsel is still
discretionary and rare.
94. Id. at § 2(d).
95. See Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed
Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (2002)
(describing initial phases of Article 11.071's implementation).
96. Id. at 21.
97. See e.g. Ex Parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610, 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (noting
previous dismissal of application for untimely filing); id. at 612 (Baird, J., dissenting) (writ
containing "twenty claims for relief which allege serious constitutional violations"
dismissed as untimely); Ex Parte Colella, Writ No. 37,418-01 (Tex. Crim. App. July 15,
1998) (writ dismissed as untimely). In 1999, the Texas Legislature later amended Article
11.071 to permit these inmates to re-file their writs with new counsel. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. art. 11.071 § 4A'(West 2003).
98. See Hammel, supra n. 95, at 23-25 (detailing several such cases).
99. id. at 29-31 (describing criticism of Texas state post-conviction system by federal
judges in the Ricky Kerr and Johnny Joe Martinez cases).
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address the issue of what the Texas legislature meant by the
term "competent counsel." '0
The court first held, as is common in these cases, that no
constitutional right to the effective assistance of habeas counsel
exists.' °' However, the court took a unique approach to
interpreting the intent of the legislature in passing a law
guaranteeing "competent" counsel. "Competent," the court
decided, meant that a condemned inmate's lawyer was deemed
competent by virtue of his "qualifications, experience, and
abilities at the time of his appointment." '02 Whether the lawyer
actually provided effective assistance to the inmate, the court
ruled, was irrelevant. The Legislature, the court held, did not
evince any intention that its choice of the term "competent
counsel" as it applies to the appointment of a habeas
attorney also applies to the final product or services
rendered by that otherwise experienced and competent
counsel. To require the trial court to appoint "competent
counsel who will render effective assistance to his client in
this case" would legislatively mandate a degree of
prescience that not even Texas trial judges can be expected
to display. ' °3
Even if the term "competent" had any performance
component, the court contended the inmate had no right to any
remedy, because the Legislature did not authorize condemned
inmates to file successive habeas applications raising the
incompetence of their court-appointed habeas counsel during
initial proceedings.!,0
Graves provoked several spirited dissents. Judge Price,
invoking the reasoning endorsed by the majority of courts to
consider the question, declared that "[t]he appointment of
counsel is meaningless without the requirement that counsel be
competent." 1o0 Judge Johnson canvassed the many decisions by
other state courts holding that the promise of counsel necessarily
100. Ex Parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
101. Id. at 110-11.
102. Id. at 113-14, 114 n. 45 (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.071 §§ 2(a) &
2(c) (West 2003)).
103. Id. at 116 (emphasis in original).
104. Id. at 116-117.
105. Id. at 121 (Price, J., dissenting).
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created a promise of competent assistance by that counsel and
observed further that the Texas statute's guarantee of competent
counsel makes that rationale apply "even more forcefully" to
the Texas statute. 106
III. ANALYSIS AND TRENDS
A. Expansion in a Few States
At first, the news might appear to be good for advocates of
a right to effective performance of post-conviction counsel. Ten
states recognize such a right. Many have recognized it in the
very recent past, which could indicate a trend in that direction.
However, upon closer inspection, the picture is decidedly more
mixed. The first complication to note is that few of the states
that actually recognize an enforceable, Strickland-esque right to
counsel are death-penalty states. Pennsylvania, in fact, is the
only state with a substantial death row population that affords
the full protection of effective assistance at all phases of capital
and non-capital cases alike.'07
The second observation is that many of the states that have
extended guarantees of effective post-conviction performance
106. Id. at 126 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
107. Although this Article addresses only the problem of effective assistance in the
context of capital cases, the issue of a right to post-conviction counsel for all inmates is
worth discussing. However, as I and other authors have concluded, the discussion must
focus first on capital cases, for three principal reasons. First, the consequences of shoddy
post-conviction representation are much more serious in the capital context than in the non-
capital context. Second, the distinction between capital and non-capital cases recognized by
the Supreme Court's so-called "death is different" doctrine provides an existing
conceptual framework to justify a capital-only emphasis. Third, the considerable cost and
expense of mandating the universal appointment of post-conviction counsel to America's
large prison population would ensure that any such broad reform proposal would be
deemed "dead on arrival" at most any state legislature. See Hammel, supra n. 95, at 60-61
(arguing that splitting off capital from non-capital cases first in the habeas reform context
is both workable and necessary); Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective
Assistance of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory
Grants of Capital Counsel, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 31, 36 n. 25 (arguing that even though non-
capital petitioners also have a significant interest in quality habeas representation, reform
should initially be limited to capital cases because the punishment is "irrevocable" and
because, since the 1980s, the legislative activity surrounding this issue has concerned
mostly capital appeals).
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are generally recognized as being among the most liberal and
progressive. States in this category tend to go beyond the
dictates of the federal Constitution in matters other than post-
conviction counsel,' °8 set up study commissions to examine the
fairness of their criminal justice systems,' °9 and almost without
exception entrust the defense of criminal cases, including capital
cases, to large and comparatively well-funded public defender
agencies. Even the states on this list that have the death penalty
enforce it with extreme care. New Jersey, South Dakota, and
Connecticut-all death-penalty states which offer a full
guarantee of performance in post-conviction-have collectively
managed to execute zero offenders in the modern era of capital
punishment."1°
B. Restriction and Retrenchment in the States that Count
When the decisions of the ten states that have extended a
Strickland-like guarantee of effective performance are put into
broader context, it becomes clear that the trend, such as it is, is a
minor one. As a recent thorough study of the landscape of state
post-conviction by Professor Celestine Richards McConville
108. Alaska, for instance, has held that its state constitution requires police agencies to
record incriminating statements "where feasible." Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158
(Alaska 1985).
109. Maryland has convened not one but two studies of its capital sentencing regime-
one that reported its results in 1994, and one targeted to the question of racial bias in death
sentencing, which reported its results in 2003. See Raymond Paternoster, Robert Brame, et
al., An Empirical Analysis of Maryland's Death Sentencing System with Respect to the
Influence of Race and Legal Jurisdiction (2003) (available at http://www.urhome.umd.edu
/newsdesk/pdf/finalrep.pdf) (accessed Nov. 14, 2003; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process); Governor's Commission on the Death Penalty, Report of
the Governor's Commission on the Death Penalty: An Analysis of Capital Punishment in
Maryland 1978-1993 (1994) (available at http://www.sailor.lib.md.us/md/docs/death-pen/)
(accessed Nov. 14, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). The
New Jersey Supreme Court ordered a study of potential racial bias in capital cases in In re
Proportionality Review Project (11), 757 A.2d 168 (N.J. 2000), following an earlier study,
In re Proportionality Review Project (1), 735 A.2d 528 (N.J. 1999). The study was
completed in 2001. See David S. Baime, Report to the Supreme Court Systemic
Proportionality Review Project 2000-2001 Term (available at http://www.judiciary.state
.nj.us/ baime/baimereport.pdf) (accessed Nov. 14, 2003; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
110. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., State Execution Rates (available at http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=477) (accessed Nov. 14, 2003; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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revealed, "as many as twenty of the thirty-eight death-penalty
states" have recently "address[ed] issues relating to post-
conviction counsel." "' Ten added a mandatory right to post-
conviction counsel to their statutes, elevating to thirty-two the
number of death-penalty states providing mandatory counsel to
death row inmates.' 2 Further, twenty-seven states have now
enacted standards which post-conviction counsel appointed in
capital cases are required to meet."13 However Professor
McConville observed, when it comes to states actually
monitoring the performance of appointed counsel, the "picture
is pretty bleak." 114 Only three states even provide for any sort of
monitoring, and one of those, Texas, has repudiated any notion
that a statutory guarantee of competent counsel requires
competent performance by counsel."5
In fact, many of these states, following the federal
government, explicitly rejected any right to competent counsel
even as they created a right to mandatory representation. This
indicates a more decisive and relevant trend toward relying
solely on standards to ensure competent performance by
appointed post-conviction counsel. The Antiterrorism Act added
a provision to the federal habeas statute which read: "The
ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or
State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a
ground for relief in a [federal habeas] proceeding." 116 Many
states, even as they revamped the sections of their post-
conviction statutes to provide representation to condemned
prisoners, added similar language to their post-conviction
statutes.1'
111. See McConville, supra n. 107, at 64.
112. Id. at 64-65.
113. Id. at 65.
114. Id. at 66.
115. See id. at 66-67.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2002) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
117. See e.g. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-12-205(f)(5) (West 2003) ("The ineffectiveness of
counsel during post-conviction review shall not be a basis for relief."); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-1419(c) (West 2003) (" [A] claim of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction
counsel [cannot] constitute good cause [to file a successive application]"); Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2953.21(I)(2) (West 2003) (providing that the "ineffectiveness or incompetence of
counsel" in state capital post-conviction proceedings cannot constitute "grounds for
relief"); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-163.8(D) (West 2003) ("The performance of habeas corpus
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Most death-penalty states thus fall into the category of
guaranteeing inmates counsel, but distinctly and explicitly
refusing to guarantee them competent counsel. There is obvious
tension in this position. The Supreme Court has long considered
it self-evident that "the right to counsel is the right to effective
assistance of counsel.""" It has also endorsed the obverse
observation-when the defendant "had no right to counsel, he
could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel." "9
The recent trend in state capital post-conviction cases, however,
seeks to drive a wedge between these two guarantees. The states
have created a right to counsel-but have chosen to regulate
competence ex ante, by setting out minimum qualifications for
counsel while affirmatively forbidding any ex post challenges to
counsel who, although ostensibly qualified, rendered deficient
performance. This framework leaves inmates in the "pointless
and frustrating" "0 position of enjoying a right without a remedy.
The creation of a right without a remedy is usually frowned on
by the courts "'-indeed, courts often construe statutes under the
express assumption that the lawmaker could not have intended
to create a right without a remedy. 22 Why was it taken by these
various states?
I believe the answer is simple: because these states perceive
any sort of enforceable guarantee of competent performance as
posing an unacceptable threat of delay in carrying out the death
penalty. It should be noted that every one of the states that
guarantees effective performance by state post-conviction
counsel has done so by court decision, not by legislative
enactment. By contrast, most of the decisions to strip inmates of
a potential right to effective assistance of counsel have been
taken by legislatures (although courts have done their fair share
counsel appointed pursuant to this article shall not form a basis for relief in any subsequent
habeas corpus proceeding.").
118. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) (citations omitted).
119. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S 586, 587-88 (1982).
120. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. St. Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 190 (1964),
overruled, Welch v. Tex. Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987).
121. "[O]ur Government 'has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not
of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch.,
503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)).
122. See e.g. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60.
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as well). These developments illustrate that not only state courts
but also state legislatures have received the Supreme Court's
message-" you are not obliged to guarantee death row inmates
effective performance by their post-conviction attorneys"-loud
and clear. A look at these extra-judicial developments helps
illustrate the real-world political context in which policy is
made.
Recent developments in three critical death-penalty states,
Texas, Florida and Alabama, illustrate this swift and
sophisticated resistance that proposals to create an enforceable
right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel face in
serious death-penalty jurisdictions.
1. Texas
Although it has not been widely debated in most other
states, the question of courts tolerating questionable or
incompetent performance by appointed habeas counsel in capital
cases has attracted public attention in Texas, likely owing to the
severity and frequency of the problem and to Texas's reputation
as the most active executioner. A watchdog group recentl
found enough horror stories to fill a seventy-nine-page report.'3
The documented instances-all of which involved death-penalty
cases, and all of which involved lawyers appointed by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals-included lawyers who
9 filed two-page habeas corpus applications;'
2 4
" missed mandatory state and federal deadlines;'25
" filed no extra-record claims, or filed petitions which
merely "plagiariz[ed] claims and arguments from previous
123. See generally Texas Defender Service, Lethal Indifference: The Fatal Combination
of Incompetent Attorneys and Unaccountable Courts in Texas Death Penalty Appeals
(2002) [hereinafter Lethal Indifference].
124. Id. at 14 (reprinting two-page habeas corpus application filed on behalf of Carlos
Granados); Ex parte Granados, Writ No. 51,135 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2002).
125. Lethal Indifference, supra n. 123, at 39 (noting that court-appointed habeas counsel
for Joe Lee Guy failed to ensure that his federal habeas corpus application was timely
filed); id. at 16 (describing late filing of Paul Colella's state habeas corpus application). Ex
parte Colella, Writ No. 37,428-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
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appeals only to file them in the same court that had already
rejected them" ;26
e confessed, in sworn affidavits, that they had poorly served
their death-row clients because of their ignorance of basic
principles of habeas corpus representation;'27
* filed 'motions with the court confessing to their
incompetence and asking to be removed and replaced. 2 '
Federal judges in Texas, presented with the product of
ineffective representation by state habeas counsel, have harshly
criticized the state's post-conviction system. One judge recently
described the lawyer appointed by the Court of Criminal
Appeals to represent Gregory Demery as "'sorry"' and termed
his effort "disgraceful." 29 Another described the decision to
appoint an inexperienced and unqualified lawyer to represent
Ricky Eugene Kerr as a "cynical and reprehensible attempt to
expedite [the inmate's] execution at the expense of all
semblance of fairness and integrity." 30
The recent case of Leonard Rojas brought the Court of
Criminal Appeals in for another grilling. In 1999, the court
appointed Rojas a lawyer who was suffering from bipolar
disorder, already serving two probated suspensions from
practice for his actions in other cases, and only two weeks away
126. Lethal Indifference, supra n. 123, at 13; see id. at 15 (finding that twenty-eight
percent of the habeas petitions filed since 1995 contained no references whatsoever to facts
outside the trial record).
127. See e.g. id. at 20 (appointed post-conviction lawyer admits in affidavit that when he
was appointed to represent Anibal Rousseau, "I was not familiar with how to litigate a
capital habeas corpus case and was not aware of the need to investigate facts outside of the
trial record"); Rousseau v. Johnson, No. 00-CV-27 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Lethal Indifference,
supra n. 123, at 36 (state court appointed lawyer for Napoleon Beazley admits that he was
unable to properly supervise investigation of his client's claims and described his own
work as "woefully inadequate"); Ex parte Beazley, Writ No. 36,151-02 (Tex. Crim. App.
Apr. 17, 2002).
128. Lethal Indifference, supra n. 123, at 32 (citing motion filed in the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals by court-appointed attorney for Johnny Joe Martinez). The court refused
to permit the attorney to withdraw. See Ex parte Martinez, Writ No. 36,840-02 (Tex. Crim.
App. Apr. 29, 1998); 977 S.W.2d 589, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
129. Demery v. Cockrell, Civ. A. No. H-02-4545, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2003).
130. Lethal Indifference, supra n. 123, at 23 (quoting Kerr v. Johnson, No. SA-98-CA-
151-OG, slip op. at 1, 16-17 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 1999)).
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from receiving a third probated suspension.' 3' After the lawyer's
fourteen-page petition was dismissed, the lawyer failed to secure
representation for Rojas within the deadline for federal habeas
review, causing him to lose the opportunity to pursue federal
habeas review of his conviction. As a result, Rojas received no
substantive federal habeas review of his conviction or sentence.
When new lawyers stepped in shortly before Rojas's execution,
the Court of Criminal Appeals voted six to three to deny Rojas
an additional opportunity to file for state habeas relief. He was
executed on December 4, 2002.
More than two months later, as Rojas lay cold in his grave,
three dissenting Court of Criminal Appeals judges issued a
blistering post-mortem opinion. "This Court should have
granted relief to the applicant," they wrote, because "it
appointed an attorney who should not have been appointed to
represent a capital defendant in his one opportunity to raise
claims not based solely on the record." 13 After describing
appointed counsel's licensing problems and disabilities, the
dissenters opined that appointed counsel "did not meet even the
low standards set by the Court in Graves." ' As a result of
appointed counsel's incompetence, Rojas was executed even
though the court "had no way to be certain that there were no
cognizable and meritorious claims" he could have litigated had
he been properly represented."' Finally, the dissenters criticized
the majority's decision to deny Rojas's appeal without "setting
this case for review [i.e. authorizing oral argument] and without
issuing a published opinion explaining the decision." ' Given
the importance of the issue, "the criminal jurisprudence of
Texas could benefit from an explanation beyond 'motion
denied."' 136
131. See Ex Parte Rojas, No. 39,062-01, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2003)
(unpublished) (Price, J., dissenting from denial of Motion to Protect Applicant's Right to
Federal Habeas Review) (available at http://www.cca.courts.state.tx.us/Opinions-
Non%20Published/3906201a.htm) (accessed Nov. 14, 2003; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process).
132. Id. at*1.
133. Id. at *3.
134. Id. at *6.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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News coverage of the problems with capital habeas review
in Texas, coupled with the fallout from the Rojas case, resulted
in a torrent of criticism of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Shortly after Rojas's execution, The Texas Lawyer published a
lengthy article detailing allegations of the Court of Criminal
Appeals's lax oversight of the list of qualified habeas counsel.
When confronted by a reporter with a watchdog group's charge
that the court's list of approved counsel contained one attorney
who had been dead for over three years, the court's presiding
judge, Judge Sharon Keller, replied, "No one ever told us he
was dead." ' One major Texas newspaper declared editorially
that the habeas report showed that the court "has a consistent
record of appointing incompetent lawyers";'138 another opined
that its "failure to recognize and confront problems in the face
of hard evidence only perpetuates the appearance that the court
is more interested in efficiency and moving people through the
system than in justice." "9 The post-mortem Rojas opinions
sparked renewed criticism. An article appearing in the court's
hometown newspaper, under the headline Appellate Dissent
Backs a Dead Man, commented that the "rare rhetorical
exchange fueled long-simmering questions about the court's
own competence." 140 The same day, the paper editorialized in
favor of abolishing the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
entirely, to "bring some detachment to the review of death
penalty cases." 141
Amid these expressions of public concern, members of the
Texas Legislature resolved to enhance the state's, capital post-
conviction program. The end result of that reform effort,
however, highlights the political difficulty any proposal which
137. Mary Alice Robbins, Habeas Hullabaloo: Report Alleges CCA Ruling Thwarts
Statute's Competent-Counsel Requirement, 18 Tex. Law. 1, 21 (Dec. 9, 2002).
138. Editorial, Legislature Must Act to Reform Process, Express-News (San Antonio,
Tex.) B6 (Dec. 3, 2002).
139. Editorial, Poor Defendants Deserve Competent Appellate Lawyers, American-
Statesman (Austin, Tex.) A16 (Dec. 5, 2002).
140. David Pasztor, Appellate Dissent Backs a Dead Man, American-Statesman (Austin,
Tex.) Al (Feb. 14, 2003).
141. See Editorial Staff, Improve Texas Justice by Combining Courts, American-
Statesman (Austin, Tex.) A I0 (Feb. 18, 2003) (pointing out that Texas is one of two states
with separate supreme courts for civil and criminal cases, and advocating abolition of the
Court of Criminal Appeals and combination of its jurisdiction with that of the Texas
Supreme Court).
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can be portrayed as lengthening the appeals process necessarily
faces. State Democratic Senator Rodney Ellis introduced Senate
Bill number 1224 during the 78th Texas Legislature. The bill
mandated specified standards for post-conviction counsel in
Texas capital cases, and it amended the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure to permit the filing of successive habeas corpus
applications containing new claims when "the applicant was
represented by incompetent counsel during the initial
application" and "as a direct result of the incompetence, a
meritorious claim or issue raised in the current [successive]
application was not raised in the initial application." 142 This
second habeas application would be required to be filed "not
later than the 60th day after the date on which the federal court
of appeals denies the applicant relief." 4' The bill passed the
Texas Senate unanimously.
In the Texas House, however, a state representative
substituted his own version of the bill, which kept the explicit
statutory standards for counsel but removed the language
permitting the filing of a successive habeas corpus application in
cases of prior attorney incompetence.'" The bill later died in
conference. The rejection of the successor-permission standards,
it bears noting, may not be a signal of disapproval. Shortly
before the conference committee met, forty-one Democratic
members of the Texas House of Representatives relocated to
Ardmore, Oklahoma, to prevent passage of a Republican
redistricting bill.'45 The mass Democratic defection created a
poisoned atmosphere' 46 in the Texas Legislature that doomed
most Democrat-s onsored bills, including the original habeas
reform proposal.
4
Nevertheless, the remedy permitting the filing of successive
142. Texas Sen. 1224, 78th Leg. Sess. at §§ 4(a)(4)(A), (B) (filed Mar. 12, 2003).
143. Id. at § 4(g).
144. See Tex. Sen. 1224, 78th Leg. Sess. (substitute drafted by Rep. Terry Keel, R-
Austin).
145. See Dave Harmon & Laylan Copelin, Home to the Capitol: Wayward Lawmakers
Journey to Austin Now that Redistricting's Dead, American-Statesman (Austin, Tex.) Al
(May 16,2003).
146. Id. (quoting Democratic lawmaker's prediction that remainder of post-walkout
session was "not going to be a love fest" ).
147. Interview with Andrea Keilen, Staff Atty., Tex. Defender Serv. (July 30, 2003)
(notes on file with author).
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petitions based on ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction
counsel was one of the more controversial provisions of the bill.
The Office of the Attorney General of Texas (OAG) insisted that
a "fiscal note" be added to the bill, a procedure required for any
proposed legislation that would have necessitated new spending.
According to the OAG, the bill, by weakening procedural bars,
would have a "significant, immediate impact on the OAG" :148
The effect of Section 4 of the proposed legislation is that
capital inmates will now have a second bite at the apple in
state court, the federal procedural bar will be worthless, and
the OAG (who represents the [State of Texas] in federal
habeas appeals) will be in the position of either waiving the
inmate's failure to exhaust claims in state court (and
acquiescing to federal court adjudication of the claims in
the first instance) or filing motions to dismiss without
prejudice for failure to exhaust to give the state courts the
opportunity to pass on the claim first (which will result in
massive delays and likely a "ping-pong" effect between
state and federal court).
149
Given that the State of Texas was running a $10 billion
budget deficit during the 78th Legislative Session, the
attachment of a fiscal note to any piece of legislation (signifying
that it would require the outlay of extra funds) was its death
knell. The Legislative session ended without any reform at all to
Texas's post-conviction scheme.
2. Florida
Florida's situation also shows the entrenched real-world
political forces with which habeas reform proposals must
contend. In Florida, some legislators are seeking to legislatively
overrule Olive v. Maas,'50 the state supreme court decision
striking down Florida's caps on compensation for state capital
post-conviction counsel. An advisor to the Speaker of the
Florida House of Representatives suggested statutory language
that "expressly precludes any right of the defendant to raise
148. Memorandum from Gena Bunn, Chief, Post-Conviction Litig. Div., Off. of Tex.
Atty. Gen., to Fiscal Note Staff, Budget & Purchasing Div., Off. of Tex. Atty. Gen., at I
(Apr. 28, 2003) (copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
149. Id. at 2.
150. 811 So. 2d 644, 654 (Fla. 2002).
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issues as to the adequacy of the post-conviction
representation." ' Language such as this would eliminate any
possibility of the Florida Supreme Court again striking down the
competency caps, it is thought, because "since competency
can't be challenged [on constitutional grounds], caps can't be
challenged either." 152 The legislature "promptly" passed a bill
striking from the rolls of eligible counsel any lawyer who sought
compensation above the statutory maximum. 3
What is striking about these episodes of retrenchment is
how the rhetoric they generate makes specific reference to the
"permission" states have been given not to expand an inmate's
right to effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction
litigation. The Nevada Supreme Court, as noted above, in 1996
overruled a prior decision in which it had found that post-
conviction counsel had "failed to provide the required caliber of
representation." 114 Arguing that habeas petitioners "have made a
sham out of the system of justice and thwarted imposition of
their ultimate penalty with continuous petitions for relief that
often present claims without a legal foundation," the court
stated that it did not "want to go beyond [Pennsylvania v.1
Finley." 155
2. Alabama
A recent National Law Journal article provides some
insight into the situation in Alabama, which does not guarantee
any appointment of counsel to death-sentenced inmates at all.
Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor, defending Alabama's
system in a 2001 letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
declared that "those inmates who do not have reasonable ground
to seek collateral review of their sentence ... do not need a
lawyer." 156 The question thereby begged-how inmates are to
15 1. Leonard Post, A Fight Over Limits on Pay, Hours: Florida Faces a Suit From a
Death Penalty Lawyer, 25 Nati. L.J. A I (Mar. 31, 2003) (quoting David De La Paz).
152. Id. (paraphrasing De La Paz)
153. Id.
154. Bejarano v. Warden, 929 P.2d 922, 925 (Nev. 1996) (quoting Grondin v. State, 634
P.2d 454, 456 (Nev. 1981)).
155. Id. at 925.
156. Leonard Post, On Their Own: In Alabama, Some Inmates Don't Have Lawyers as
They Near the Last Bidfor Life, 26 Natl. L.J. 1, 14 (Dec. 1, 2003) (quoting Pryor).
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determine whether they have reasonable ground to seek
collateral review without the assistance of a lawyer-was
answered by Clay Crenshaw, chief of the Capital Litigation
Division of the Alabama Attorney General's Office:
The inmate himself would know what evidence could and
should have been presented at the guilt or penalty phase[.]
Say if he has an alibi that he told his lawyer about, but his
lawyer didn't raise it. I've seen that happen.'57
The views of Alabama officials are determined by their
answer to the question of whether death penalty post-conviction
petitions should be treated like non-capital ones. In non-capital
cases, the right to appointment of counsel in most states is
contingent: An inmate must first file a post-conviction petition
that states a potentially meritorious claim (or which, in the trial
judge's view, merits a hearing) before obtaining the assistance
of a lawyer.'58 Virtually the entire rest of the nation has
determined that capital post-conviction petitions require special
treatment and that death-sentenced inmates should receive
assistance from a lawyer as they prepare their petitions. 9 Even
the Supreme Court, notably reluctant to endorse any
constitutional guarantee of counsel, has long interpreted the
federal habeas statute to ensure that death-sentenced inmates
receive counsel and stays of execution before they are required
to file their petitions. Responding to the argument that a
capitally sentenced federal habeas petitioner should be required
to file a petition on his own in order to trigger the right to
counsel, the Court demurred, declaring that the assistance of an
attorney at the pre-petition phase was "crucial" and that
"[r]equiring an indigent capital petitioner to proceed without
counsel in order to obtain counsel ... would expose him to the
157. Id.
158. See generally Hammel, supra n. 95, at 83-99 (describing state laws on the right of
non-capitally sentenced inmates to habeas representation, and finding that most states
provide no right to the appointment of counsel to help an inmate investigate claims and
draft a petition, but rather make the right to a lawyer contingent on an inmate's previously
filed claims satisfying a certain standard of meritoriousness, or requiring a hearing).
159. See generally id. (observing that all death penalty states except Alabama and
Georgia now, either de jure or de facto, guarantee the pre-petition appointment of counsel
to all capitally sentenced prisoners who wish to pursue appeals).
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substantial risk that his habeas claims never would be heard on
the merits." "0
Even though Alabama thus represents a position that has
already been abandoned by virtually all other jurisdictions, and
even by the Supreme Court, one of its supreme court justices
recently affirmed that Alabama in fact does afford "adequate
representation" to its capitally sentenced inmates. ' It is not
hard to imagine how a reform package that appears to confer
procedural benefits on death-row inmates (or one that could be
so portrayed) would fare in such a political climate.
III. LOOSENING THE GORDIAN KNOT.
Thus, there seems to be policy gridlock-the Gordian knot
of habeas reform. Doctrinal arguments, no matter how well-
crafted, appear unlikely to convince federalism-minded federal
courts to intervene in the state post-conviction arena in any
systemic, organizational way (by, for instance, mandating the
creation of post-conviction defender agencies). At the state
level, the states can be grouped into two general categories. In
the first category are states whose policy favors robust and
vigorous protection of the appellate rights of defendants. These
states will voluntarily exceed the minimum of federal
constitutional compliance in the area of post-conviction appeals
without prompting. In another category are states that are well
aware that the Supreme Court has deprived federal courts of any
federal constitutional mandate to regulate state post-conviction
process and, it appears, are generally only disposed to improve
offenders' representation in return for a quid pro quo of some
sort or another.
Few dispute the problems caused by ineffective
representation in capital post-conviction cases, coupled with the
well-established federal rule that "the most egregious
negligence of counsel in representing a prisoner seeking state
post-conviction relief cannot violate the Constitution and thus
cannot establish cause for procedural default." 162 Indeed, it is
160. McFarlandv. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855, 856 (1994).
161. Post, supra n. 156, at 15 (quoting Alabama Supreme Court Justice Harold See).
162. Larry W. Yackle, Federal Courts: Habeas Corpus 208 (Found. Press 2003).
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precisely this realization that has stimulated the development of
competency standards, and the AEDPA's quid pro quo. There
are two reform proposals that purport to provide some safeguard
of counsel competency without creating an additional layer of
review: mandatory standards of competency and "during-
performance review." In this Section, I will describe why I
believe that these proposals, although promising, do not
completely resolve the problem.
A. Why Standards Aren't Enough
The first proposed solution, and the one adopted by the
AEDPA, is counsel-competency standards. Many
commentators-this one included-think that a standards-only
approach is ineffective,'63 and I believe it may do more harm
than good. First, no set of standards will keep marginal
performers off the list, for many reasons. The first might be
termed the "experienced loser" effect. As Stephen Bright has
observed, many trial lawyers who have appeared in many capital
trials would appear well-qualified owing to their experience.
They have handled several capital cases-but have won few or
none.M The same can be said about post-conviction appeals. In
Texas, most of the lawyers currently approved for appointment
to death-penalty post-conviction appeals have turned in
apparently superficial appeals in previous cases.1
65
Thus, as a practical matter, there may simply not be enough
lawyers with the requisite specialized experience to handle a
163. See McConville, supra n. 107, at 101 (noting that counsel standards, even if
"rigorous and enforced," are "insufficient standing alone"); Burke W. Kappler, Small
Favors: Chapter 154 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the States, and
the Right to Counsel, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 467, 583-85 (2000) (arguing that
standards are difficult to calibrate in such a way as to ensure a large enough pool of
qualified lawyers to handle the demand, and that in any event standards alone often prove
ineffective because "some of the worst lawyers are the ones with the greatest caseloads and
the largest docket" and thus the "significant experience" called for by many standards).
164. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835, 1871 n. 209 (1994)
165. Lethal Indifference, supra n. 123, at 46-47 (2002) (observing that eighteen percent
of the attorneys on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals list of approved post-conviction
counsel as of October 2002 had previously filed at least one post-conviction writ raising no
extra-record claims, and fifty-seven percent had previously filed at least one post-
conviction petition that contained no extra-record proof).
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particular state's death-penalty case load. California, for
instance, is famously unable to find enough lawyers who are
qualified to represent its inmates in state direct appeals, a fact
that has led to ever-increasing appellate delays. And post-
conviction representation in capital cases is somewhat more
technical-and vastly more time-consuming-than direct appeal
work. Commentators in Florida have observed that the
Governor's proposal to farm capital post-conviction work out to
private counsel will run into the inevitable brick wall-
competency standards rigorous enough to genuinely restrict the
list to qualified and experienced lawyers with a demonstrated
expertise in capital post-conviction appeals will result in a list
insufficient to address the need. 67
Post-conviction representation of death-row inmates is
time-consuming, difficult to master, and poorly compensated
relative to other forms of legal work. There are therefore very
few lawyers in private practice who have made post-conviction
representation such a significant component of their practice that
they can be relied upon to perform competently in every case.
Therefore, at least some death-row inmates will have to be
represented by lawyers selected for their general ability, but who
may, in certain cases, make serious mistakes. The only way to
ensure that these inmates receive full and fair review of their
convictions is to enable them to challenge their previous
lawyers' performance. But, of course, it is precisely that
component of performance guarantees that excites the political
resistance described above.
Bound up with the ineffectuality of a standards-only
approach is its strong "legitimation effect" -defined by
166. See e.g. Ryan S. Hedges, Student Author, Justices Blind: How the Rehnquist
Court's Refusal to Hear a Claim for Inordinate Delay of Execution Undermines Its Death
Penalty Jurisprudence, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 577, 591-92 (2001) (observing that in California,
stringent qualifications and inadequate compensation have resulted in a shortage of lawyers
to file direct appeals on behalf of California death-row prisoners, leading to a delay of up to
four years before the average California death-row prisoner is appointed counsel).
167. Kappler, supra n. 163, at 584; see also Post, supra n. 156 (paraphrasing veteran
Florida capital litigator Mark Olive's comment that there are not enough Florida lawyers
"up to the task" to adequately represent Florida's 360 death row prisoners, and reporting
on study of Florida death-penalty cases by the Spangenberg Group which concluded that
death-penalty post-conviction appeals are "too complex and time-consuming for an
attorney without substantial experience" to competently perform, and that there is a
"paucity" of lawyers in Florida and in the country with the requisite experience).
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Professors Jordan and Carol Steiker as stemming from
reforms [that] do very little to change the underlying
practice but may offer the appearance of much greater
procedural regularity than they actually produce, thus
inducing a false or exaggerated belief in the fairness of the
entire system of capital punishment."'
Competency standards, at least when put forward as the sole
means of guaranteeing effective performance, are a classically
legitimizing reform. The only truly effective guarantee is one
that requires counsel to actually perform competently and that
provides a workable remedy for the petitioner when that does
not happen.
B. During-Performance Review
Professor McConville has recently sketched out such a
potential reform. She first sets out the case against a standards-
only approach, noting the political hostility toward solutions to
the counsel-competency problem that contemplate "post-
performance" review-that is, an additional appellate
proceeding after the inmate's first habeas corpus petition has
been resolved, in which the inmate would litigate his challenges
to the initial habeas counsel's competency.169
So far, as should be clear from the tone of this article, I am
in complete agreement with Professor McConville. Her solution
is during-performance review-that is, at some defined point
during the post-conviction representation (perhaps after the
initial post-conviction application is filed), either the court or an
independent body would be required to assess post-conviction
counsel's performance. Post-conviction counsel who are clearly
not making the grade could be replaced, and substitute counsel
would be given additional time to properly finish the job of
representing a particular inmate. 7 ° She readily admits that her
proposal will not catch every instance of substandard
168. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative
"Reform" of the Death Penalty? 63 Ohio St. L.J. 417, 422 (2002).
169. See McConville, supra n. 107, at 105-08 (criticizing workability of post-
performance review on the ground of its obvious potential to add significant delay to the
capital review process).
170. Id. at 101-03.
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representation.' 7' But she makes a strong case that it is a
workable and politically palatable compromise solution that will
prevent some of the most disturbing outcomes tolerated under
current law. She is currently developing her idea of during-
performance review, and it could certainly prove an attractive
proposal.
The principal weakness in McConville's idea as presently
proposed is its reliance on changes in doctrine. As a
constitutional justification for her proposal, she argues that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, properly
construed, requires states to enforce some modest guarantee of
competent performance once they have undertaken to provide
indigent death row inmates with lawyers. She critiques in
particular the current Supreme Court's reliance on Wainwright
v. Torna,"' which the later Court has taken-incorrectly, she
maintains-to rule out any "middle ground" of rights protection
between a full Strickland guarantee and no protection at all.
73
She argues that Torna actually does not resolve "the specific
question whether the Constitution imposes due process
obligations on the state and federal governments once they
voluntarily decide to provide counsel." ' Professor McConville
draws on an alternate line of Supreme Court precedents to argue
that, when states promise death row inmates representation by
counsel, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that prisoners be able to "meaningfully" enjoy this
right.'75 This argument, she proposes, can prod states to provide
at least some level of protection through during-performance
review.
However, as I have elsewhere maintained, I think doctrinal
change-even on the modest scale proposed by Professor
McConville-is simply not going to happen in today's political
climate.'76 A survey of recent decisions of the United States
171. Id. at 103 (conceding that "during-performance reviews do not fully protect the
capital defendant," because "the reviewing bodies realistically cannot scrutinize each and
every decision made by counsel").
172. 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982).
173. McConville, supra n. 107, at 35-36.
174. Id. at 68 (footnote omitted).
175. Id. at 68-80.
176. See Hammel, supra n. 95, at 55-61 (2002) (arguing that United States Supreme
Court decisions demonstrate that, at least in the short term, there is no indication that the
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Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit provides insight into how
her arguments have fared in a federal court that hears appeals
from Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana-three states with very
active death rows. As death-row inmates who had been
represented by questionably qualified or incompetent state post-
conviction lawyers in the Texas state courts have reached the
Fifth Circuit, resourceful federal habeas counsel have
desperately sought to escape from the straitjacket of procedural
default that prevents them from obtaining merits review of
issues. overlooked by state post-conviction counsel. Counsel
have presented the Fifth Circuit not only with the standard,
doomed invitations to overrule Coleman or to recognize an
exception to it, but with more nuanced and creative arguments
similar to those advanced by Professor McConville.
The Fifth Circuit has, however, brushed all such arguments
aside, often in unpublished opinions. In In re Goff,'77 the Fifth
Circuit, citing "strong [contrary] precedent," rejected an
argument very much like Professor McConville's-i.e., that the
"substantive and procedural due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment" required Texas to follow through on
its promise of "competent" state habeas counsel to death-
sentenced inmates.'78 Other petitioners have sought to rely on a
provision of the federal habeas statute that excuses capital
habeas petitioners from the requirement that they exhaust their
claims in state court upon a showing that the state process is
"ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant."' 79 When the
state promises a death row inmate competent counsel and then
reneges on that promise, this argument holds, the corrective
process it offers is inadequate to protect the applicant's rights. In
a recent unpublished decision, the Fifth Circuit rejected this
argument by a brief citation to an earlier published decision
which had treated the argument in passing.'"°
Court intends to overrule any prior decisions definitively rejecting any right to effective
assistance of state post-conviction counsel).
177. 250 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2001).
178. Id. at 276 (quoting, and recognizing abrogation of, Welch v. Beto, 355 F.2d 1016,
1020 (5th Cir. 1966)).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
180. Jones v. Cockrell, No. 02-41459, at *7 (5th Cir., July 28, 2003) (unpublished)
(available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/02/02-41459.0.wpd.pdf)
(accessed Nov. 14, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). The
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
Perhaps the most dramatic attempt to obtain some
recognition of any obligation on Texas's part to provide
competent counsel came in Martinez v. Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals.' Martinez involved claims brought by three death row
inmates approaching their executions. Each of them had been
represented by state habeas counsel, appointed under Texas's
guarantee of "competent" state habeas counsel, who, the
inmates alleged, had failed to plead "obvious and potentially
meritorious claims of constitutional error" during state post-
conviction proceedings.'82 "Each Plaintiff," the court observed,
"was unsuccessful in his subsequent attempt to secure federal
habeas relief, because the federal courts were procedurally
barred from considering the constitutional claims omitted from
the state habeas petition." ' 3 As a result, "the Plaintiffs were
never afforded an opportunity to present these claims to any
state or federal court." 184
The plaintiffs sued the state of Texas-and each of the nine
judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals-in federal court
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that state officials had
"violated the Plaintiffs' rights under the Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments by engaging in a policy of 'knowingly
and intentionally' appointing incompetent lawyers to represent
indigent death row inmates in their state habeas proceedings." 85
The plaintiffs requested that their imminent executions be
stayed, that the federal court enjoin the state of Texas to provide
them with competent counsel, and that the federal court enter a
Jones court, in turn, cited Martinez v. Cockrell, 255 F.3d 229, 240-41 (5th Cir. 2001).
However, on the text of the pages cited, the Martinez court had addressed only the
constitutional framework governing the potential use of incompetent state post-conviction
representation to excuse procedural default. The Martinez court only addressed the
statutory argument in a footnote which, in its entirety, reads, "Contrary to Martinez's
assertion, under these facts, failure to provide 'competent' counsel for a state habeas
petition does not fall under the general catch-all exception provided in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(I)(B)(ii)." ld. at 239 n. 10. The Jones court rejected Jones's argument that the
Martinez court had provided "insufficient reasoning" for its rejection of this argument and
his request that it "fairly address the argument." Jones, No. 02-41459, at *7 (quoting
briefing from petitioner). Instead, it treated the matter as definitively resolved by Martinez
and noted that it was bound by the decision of a coordinate panel of the court.
181. 292 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2002).
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declaratory judgment that federal courts need not apply a
procedural default bar to "procedural defaults occasioned by
incompetence of state habeas counsel." 86
The court rejected all of the plaintiffs' arguments. First, the
court noted, the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief
preventing their approaching executions was "the functional
equivalent of a request for a stay of execution," which could be
requested only as part of a habeas proceeding, not in a civil-
rights action.' Even if the requests had been brought before the
court in the procedurally correct posture, the court held, it would
interpret them as "effectively asking [the court] to reverse long-
standing Supreme Court precedent and to rewrite the federal
habeas statute." ' For good measure, the court alternatively
construed the plaintiffs' civil-right suit as a request to file a
successive habeas corpus application pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b),'89 and preemptively denied that as well.' 90 All three
plaintiffs were later executed on schedule.' 9'
Of course, Professor McConville's notion of during-
performance review stands on its own as a workable solution for
states that wish to ensure a certain level of performance by state
post-conviction counsel without taking on very many burdens.
However, to the extent that she invokes constitutional doctrine
to force reluctant states to set up some mechanism for during-
performance review, it faces significant hurdles. The example of
the Fifth Circuit shows a federal court that is simply
unconcerned with the quality of representation death row
inmates receive in state post-conviction proceeding and
unwilling to take any doctrinal steps in the direction of (1)
recognizing or enforcing any right to any particular level of
quality of post-conviction representation or (2) recognizing any
form of substandard representation-no matter how evident-as
cause to excuse a procedural default.
186. Id. at 420.
187. Id. at 423.
188. Id. at 424.
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
190. Id.
191. See Tex. Dept. of Crim. Justice, Executed Offenders (available at http://www.tdcj
.state.tx.us/stat/executedoffenders.htm) (accessed Nov. 14, 2003; copy on file with Journal
of Appellate Practice and Process) (reflecting that Gary Etheridge was executed on August
20, 2002; Napoleon Beazley on May 28, 2002; and Johnny Joe Martinez on May 22, 2002).
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Finally, it must be noted that a proposal to monitor the
effectiveness of a particular death row inmate's post-conviction
representation is only as effective as the body that performs the
monitoring. Even assuming diligence and good faith on the part
of the monitoring body, Professor McConville has
acknowledged that an outside observer, viewing the appeal mid-
stream, will only be able to form a rough approximation of the
quality of appointed counsel's performance. However, there is a
deeper problem. In states such as Georgia or Texas, state courts
have shown no hesitancy to affirm clearly incompetent
representation. In Texas, the high court and its supporters have
consistently justified the performance of lawyers who have filed
superficial appeals by speculating that these lawyers' clients
were evidently clearly guilty and deserving of death, and
therefore that the lawyers simply had no complex, substantive,
case-specific claims to raise.'2 In such a legal climate, it is
certainly questionable whether a high court or appointed
commission would recognize a truly exacting standard of
competent performance-and even whether it would risk
delaying an execution to remedy a violation of a proper
standard.
IV. CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT
Another potential solution to the seemingly insoluble
political and legal problem that arises in states such as Texas
and Georgia bears thinking about. Perhaps instead of stretching
the right to effective assistance to cover post-conviction
appeals-something many state or federal courts simply will not
do, no matter how ingenious and persuasive the legal
justification-post-conviction appeals could instead be folded
back into a level of the process that is already governed by
effective assistance guarantees-direct appeal. That is, make the
192. See e.g. Charles Rosenthal, Habeas Process Works Fine, Houston Chron. A47
(Dec. 14, 2002) (quoting, in letter to the editor written while serving as Harris County
District Attorney, comment by Court of Criminal Appeals Presiding Judge Sharon Keller
that "[tihe fact that that not everyone is getting [relief] is not an indication that anything is
wrong with the system," and attributing brevity of some petitions to the fact that "[flactual
claims do not arise in all death penalty cases, and a very small proportion of death penalty
cases have meritorious factual claims, regardless of the amount of publicity given to that
small handful").
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direct appeal a forum for deciding not only record-based claims,
but also claims based on new facts and evidence relevant to the
fairness of the trial. This, to be sure, would be a significant
break from existing practice in many states. Most death-penalty
states currently provide that post-conviction attacks may be filed
only upon, completion of an inmate's direct appeal.'93 But, as I
will argue, combining the steps should, under current Supreme
Court precedent, result in the automatic extension of the full
Strickland guarantee to the entire state appeals process.
A. Traditional Rationales for Affording Fewer Procedural
Safeguards to Post-conviction Appeals
At this point, it may make sense to canvass the rationales
offered by the Supreme Court when it reaffirms that "direct
appeal is the primary avenue for review of a conviction or
sentence, and death penalty cases are no exception" and
relegates the writ of habeas corpus to the a "secondary and
limited," if nevertheless "important," role in safeguarding
constitutional rights. 94 The three main rationales are the
conditional or secondary role of habeas corpus proceedings, the
fact that they represent an attack upon a final and presumptively
valid conviction, and the fact that they occur years after the
original trial. In the next section, I will argue that, in the modern
era of rigid deadlines and overlapping appeals, these rationales
are quickly losing persuasive force.
1. Conditional and Secondary Nature
In non-capital cases, post-conviction appeals are not
considered routinely necessary because trial and direct appeal
suffice (or at least are deemed to suffice) to address the vast
majority of the allegations of error the justice system is willing
to spend the resources to correct. 95 The state is not even
193. See Ryan Commission Report, supra n. 3, at 170 (observing that eight death-penalty
states "condition the filing of a post-conviction petition upon completion of proceedings on
direct appeal," and recommending that Illinois do the same).
194. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983).
195. See Pa. v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557, 558 (1987) (stressing that by the time prisoner
had filed her post-conviction attack, she had already received representation at trial and in
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constitutionally obliged to provide a direct appeal forum for
convicts. Its obligation to provide a post-conviction forum, this
line of reasoning goes, is yet more tenuous, and therefore the
procedural safeguards attaching to post-conviction proceedings
are even less grounded. Thus, there is no objection to the state
enforcing a watered-down or "second-class" counsel guarantee
in post-conviction proceedings that would not pass
constitutional muster in the direct-appeal context. 196
Of course, these dismissive pronouncements coexist with
other statements, many taken from capital cases, that emphasize
the importance of collateral review. The Court's ambivalence
about collateral proceedings perhaps stems from the writ's
history as an equitable and discretionary remedy.' 97 Originally,
the writ was an "extraordinary" writ available only "where the
ordinary legal remedies [against unjust confinement] were
unavailable or inadequate." '9 This historical conception of the
writ's status helps to explain the Court's peculiar statements
about the writ, which alternate between dismay at the writ's
tendency to "strike at finality" and recognition of its critical role
in securing adherence to constitutional norms.
2. Attack on Finality
Collateral attacks undermine finality in two separate senses.
First, they seek to upset convictions "to which a presumption of
finality and legality" has attached by virtue of their having been
affirmed on direct appeal. 9 Thus, unlike direct appeals, they are
filed only by persons who have already had the presumption of
innocence stripped from them at trial, and who further have had
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania during direct appeal, which appeal guaranteed her an
"independent review of the record by competent counsel").
196. Finley, 481 U.S. at 556-57 (disputing assertion that the "'right to counsel' can have
only one meaning, no matter what the source of that right, and affirming that post-
conviction counsel's assistance need not rise to the level of constitutionally effective
assistance of counsel).
197. See e.g. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 478 n. II (1.977) (citing previous
precedents, which stressed the "equitable" and "discretionary" nature of the writ).
198. William F. Duker, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus 4 (Greenwood Press
1980).
199. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. at 887; see also Pa. v. Finley, 481 U.S. at 557
(describing post-conviction relief "normally" occurring "only after the defendant has
failed to secure relief through direct review of his conviction").
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the fairness of that trial proceeding confirmed by at least one
court.2 0 In capital cases, habeas proceedings also undermine
finality in the more direct sense that the convict, by common
consensus, may not be executed when they are still pending.'
3. Remoteness of Trial
Related to finality is temporal remoteness. When the Court
decided the leading modem habeas cases, federal law contained
no statute of limitations for post-conviction claims except for a
frail "laches" provision, which forbade a federal court to
consider a delayed petition only when the state had satisfied a
"heavy" burden to prove it had been prejudiced by an inmate's
delay in filing his petition.22 Delayed attacks on a final
conviction harm confidence in the justice system because "when
a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the
'erosion of memory" and "dispersion of witnesses" that occur
with the passage of time' prejudice the government and diminish
the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication."2 3
B. Do These Justifications Still Persuade?
The Supreme Court has yet to explicitly acknowledge this
fact, but significant changes in the scope, role, and nature of
post-conviction proceedings in capital cases have drained every
one of its arguments of much of their persuasive force. This
observation is especially true concerning state post-conviction
systems that have unitary appeal structures, as I will discuss
later.
Even in non-unitary states, however, the rationales are
weak. First, collateral attacks, in capital cases, are commonplace
and crucial. They are commonplace because every state now
provides a post-conviction forum to every condemned inmate,
the vast majority of them now also provide lawyers, and every
200. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
201. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492 (1991).
202. See Walters v. Scott, 21 F.3d 683, 686-87 (5th Cir. 1994) (interpreting former Rule
9(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Proceedings).
203. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 433, 453
(1986)).
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capital prisoner who does not wish to volunteer for execution
pursues post-conviction relief-sometimes multiple times."', The
Mississippi Supreme Court has, in fact, recognized post-
conviction appeals as a routine "appendage" of the capital-case
review process. °5 Professor Larry Yackle has noted that the
structure and function of modem federal habeas review is hardly
exotic, but rather has "an undeniable appellate flavor."206 One
might also question why, if post-conviction remedies in capital
cases are "secondary and limited," so much attention has been
paid to them. Law journals and blue-ribbon commissions have
devoted an extraordinary amount of intellectual energy to
analyzing the proper scope and nature of post-conviction
proceedings in capital cases.' °7 Further, the consensus that
collateral attacks are bulwarks against injustice every bit as
important as direct appeal-especially in the wake of Professor
204. See e.g. Kappler, supra n. 163, at 579:
However, on a practical basis, every state offers some form of post-conviction
remedy and post-conviction litigation has become a standard part in the lifecycle
of a capital case. Furthermore, the analogy to a sword which the prisoner uses at
his discretion to initiate the collateral attack is inapt, because the federal habeas
corpus statute requires exhaustion of state remedies. For a prisoner to choose not
to pursue state post-conviction remedies is a procedural default and a bar to
federal habeas corpus review. Direct appeal and post-conviction attack are not
simply options for the capital prisoners; they are required steps he must take to
be vindicated.
205. Jackson v. State, 732 So. 2d 187, 190 (Miss. 1999).
206. See Yackle, supra n. 162, at 4. Professor Yackle later summarizes the work of other
scholars who have argued that "federal habeas corpus only appeared formally to
contemplate original civil actions against state prison wardens" but that in reality habeas
was an "appellate matter long before Brown [v. Allen, 344 U.S. 433 (1953)]." Id. at 293-94
(citing and discussing law review articles by Professors Daniel J. Meador, Jordan Steiker,
Barry Friedman, and James S. Liebman). These debates take place in a considerably more
remote and rarefied sphere than does this Article, which is intended to take the gritty
realities of the political context of post-conviction reform into account. They nevertheless
demonstrate that the modem federal writ of habeas corpus, considered in terms of the
practical role it fulfills, is little more than an "extra" appeal to be pursued after state-court
appeals are final.
207. See McConville, supra n. 107, at 37-38 nn. 26-28, 48-52 (citing scholarly
commentary on capital post-conviction proceedings and discussing Powell Committee
Report and American Bar Association study of capital post-conviction proceedings);
Kappler, supra n. 163, at 580 (reporting on same commissions and citing to comments by
"[sicholars, academics, judges, practitioners and students" supporting right to counsel).
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James Liebman's influential study of error rates in capital
cases°8-has now become reasonably settled.
The fear that post-conviction attacks will be filed many
years after trial and direct appeal have concluded is also no
longer justified. Most death-penalty states have imposed
procedural deadlines that will, as a practical matter, require all
post-conviction challenges to be filed with a specific time after
the defendant's conviction is upheld on direct review. These
laws will ensure that state post-conviction appeals will almost
without exception be filed within three to four years of
conviction. In Illinois, for example, collateral attack deadlines
are structured in such a way that it is possible that the post-
conviction appeal will be filed before the direct appeal against
the conviction has even been resolved .2
Other states have gone even farther than Illinois and have
expressly created unitary appellate systems for death-penalty
cases. Such systems are explicitly contemplated by the AEDPA,
which added a section to the federal habeas statute that explains
how they are to be treated under the AEDPA's expedited-review
quid-pro-quo framework. 2 0  So-called unitary review systems,
which are currently in force in Colorado,2 ' Texas,22 Ohio, and
214Idaho, present the clearest picture of how outdated the
208. James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System, Error Rates in
Capital Cases, 1973-1995 (2000) (available at http://justice.policy.net/cjedfund/jpreport/)
(accessed Dec. 31, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
209. The Ryan Commission criticized existing Illinois law, which requires an Illinois
defendant to file his post-conviction attack within three years of conviction regardless of
the status of his direct appeal, on the grounds that "requiring a capital defendant to file a
post-conviction petition before his original appeal is complete represents an unwise policy
choice." Ryan Commission Report, supra n. 3, at 170.
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 2265 (2002) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
211. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-12-201 et seq. (West 2003) (statutory scheme adopted in
1997 to create new "unitary" review scheme in death-penalty cases); see also Colo. R.
Crim. Proc. 32.2(b)(3) (setting out deadline of 150 days from date defendant is advised of
his right to new post-conviction counsel, which in turn must be held within five days after
sentence is imposed).
212. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 4(a) (West 2003) (providing that habeas
corpus application in capital case must be filed no later than 180 days after appointment of
post-conviction or "not later than the 45th day after the date the state's original brief is
filed on direct appeal, whichever date is later").
213. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.21(A)(2) (West 2003) (requiring post-conviction
motion to be filed within 180 days of date transcript is filed during direct appeal).
214. See Idaho Code § 2719 (West 2003).
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Supreme Court's rationales are. In these states, a death-
sentenced inmate begins preparing his post-conviction and direct
appeals simultaneously, shortly after the end of his trial.
To be sure, unitary systems are controversial, and generally
unpopular with capital defenders. The supreme courts of
Pennsylvania2 5 and Florida2"6 struck down their legislatures'
post-AEDPA attempts to create unitary systems, albeit only on
separation-of-powers grounds. But unitary systems bear closer
examination for the light they shed on the persuasiveness of the
rationales the Rehnquist Court has offered for declaring post-
conviction proceedings second-class procedural citizens.
C. Jettisoning the Justifications
Let us assume a death-sentenced inmate in a unitary-review
state asserts that he has a right to the effective assistance of post-
conviction counsel similar to that announced in Evitts v.
Lucey,27 which guarantees him effective assistance during his
first appeal as of right. An intellectually honest appellate court
can no longer rely on the conditionality, temporal remoteness, or
finality rationales. The inmate's post-conviction attack is routine
(because his is a capital case), it is being filed no later than his
direct appeal, and attacks a conviction that is not yet final,
because it has not yet been affirmed on direct appeal.
215. In 1999, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a unitary-review scheme
passed by the Pennsylvania Legislature on separation-of-powers grounds. The court held
that, because the supreme court was vouchsafed ultimate authority to promulgate court
rules under the Pennsylvania Constitution, a legislative act which "directly conflict[ed]
with existing procedural rules duly promulgated by this Court" could not be permitted. In
re Suspension of Capital Unitary Review Act, 722 A.2d 676, 680 (Pa. 1999).
216. Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 55, 62 (Fla. 2000) (striking down the Death
Penalty Reform Act of 2000, which changed existing post-conviction deadlines to create a
"'dual-track' capital post-conviction process, in which a death- sentenced inmate files
post-conviction claims almost contemporaneously with his or her direct appeal," on the
ground that the Florida Constitution conferred on the Florida Supreme Court the exclusive
authority to promulgate rules of procedure governing post-conviction appeals). The court
later, on its own motion, adopted changes to its rules that provided that post-conviction
counsel should be appointed within fifteen days after the defendant is sentenced to death,
but that the post-conviction petition itself need not be filed until one year after the
affirmance of the defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. See In re
Amendments to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, 3.852, & 3.993, 772 So .2d 512, 513-14 (Fla. 2000).
217. 469 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1985) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
criminal appellants the right to effective assistance of counsel during their direct appeal).
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What other potential distinctions remain? Two are
apparent: a difference in the nature of the evidence upon which
the appeal is based, and second, a remaining superficial
difference in terminology and definition (post-conviction attacks
are denominated civil proceedings and are referred to using a
specialized vocabulary). Do these distinctions make a
difference?
1. Extra-Record Evidence
Considered purely from a practical standpoint, effective
assistance of counsel is surely needed more during post-
conviction than in direct appeal proceedings. A particularly
bright and disciplined inmate could gather the transcripts of his
trial, spend several months in the law library, and turn out a
reasonably well-crafted direct appeal on points of law. Our
hypothetical gifted inmate will surely be assisted by the
contemporaneous-objection rule, which will have required his
lawyer to signal the most promising appellate claims by lodging
timely and specific objections during the trial.
Post-conviction claims, however, are another matter
entirely. No death-row inmate will ever be set free from his
prison cell to perform the "thorough, independent investigation"
of his case that is a fundamental component of competent habeas
representation."18 And post-conviction law is certainly every bit
as technical and forbidding as the law governing direct appeals.
Perhaps in years past, a post-conviction petitioner could hope to
succeed by succinctly stating his claim, sticking mainly to the
operative facts. But those days are long past. Now, post-
conviction practice involves substantial investigation followed
by the filing of an appeal every bit as complex as the direct
appeal itself.
The above arguments all tend to support one principal
218. ABA Guidelines, supra n. 8, at 1085 (Commentary to Guideline 10.15.1B). In
response to the Mississippi Supreme Court's implied holding that death row inmates were
perfectly capable of representing themselves in capital post-conviction matters, two
commentators noted that several Mississippi death-row inmates had applied for
investigative furloughs from prison and other resources to perform the investigation
necessary to represent themselves. Clive A. Stafford-Smith & Remy Voisin Stains, Folly
by Fiat: Pretending That Death Row Inmates Can Represent Themselves in State Capital
Post-Conviction Proceedings, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 55, 86 n. 146, 96 (1999).
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thesis. If we assume that all death row inmates should, as a
matter of course; be given the opportunity to raise all record-
based and extra-record claims before being executed, and we
were legislating on a clean slate, free of anachronistic rules and
classifications, and we were able to guarantee an inmate
effective performance only as to one type of claim, we would
surely choose to guarantee that performance as to extra-record
claims, not record claims!
2. Nomenclature and Classification
The only remaining distinction is one of nomenclature and
classification, which I above described as "superficial."
However, by calling it superficial, I do not mean to suggest
courts will ignore it. As a sage once remarked, law's "traditional
approach is in terms of words, it centers on words, [and has] the
utmost difficulty getting beyond words."2 '9 The abstract
categories into which history has sorted various sorts of
procedures "tend to take on an appearance of solidarity, reality
and inherent value which ha[ve] no foundation in experience."
To bring along courts which will respect the distinction
between direct appeal and post-conviction regardless of whether
it has a "foundation in experience," I propose eliminating the
distinction between direct appeal and post-conviction
completely. The proposal may seem radical, in that it would
involve a fairly fundamental restructuring of the review process
in non-unitary states. I do not, however, see it as being radical in
the sense of requiring a dramatic, pro-petitioner re-conception of
the appellate process. Such a re-conception, it bears repeating,
will spell death for any proposed reform in a conservative, law-
and-order state.
Here is how such a combined-track appeal would work:
* First, a state alters its code of criminal procedure to allow
inmates to raise both record-based and extra-record-based
claims during direct appeal.
219. Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence- The Next Step, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431,
443 (1930).
220. Id. at 453.
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9 At the end of a capital murder trial, the defendant is
assigned two (or perhaps three) new lawyers. These lawyers
will have suitable time-at the very least two full years
after preparation and delivery of the trial transcript-in
which to raise all claims relevant to the inmate's conviction
and sentence.
* The lawyers will have access to the traditional resources
needed to develop extra-record claims: investigators, expert
witnesses, access to documents, and the like.
e When the time for filing comes due, the lawyers simply
file all claims with the relevant court of appeals.
* That court first evaluates the record-based claims. These
come first because they may require reversal without
additional factual development, thus obviating the need for
any discovery or an evidentiary hearing.
* If the appeals court is satisfied that none of the record-
based claims merits reversal, it proceeds to the non-record-
based claims. At this point, it makes the traditional
judgment call post-conviction courts make: Would the
petitioner's factual allegations, if true, entitle him to relief?
* If the answer is "yes," the court remands the case to the
trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the specified
claims. The trial court then conducts the hearing, and
determines whether to recommend relief.
* If the answer is "no," the appeals court denies all relief,
and the inmate's state court appeals are finished.
* If a hearing has been held and the trial court has
recommended the granting or denial of relief, the appeals
court decides whether to accept the trial court's
recommendation. If it decides to deny relief, the inmate
moves to federal court.
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Obviously, the consolidation of the inmate's appeals should
not serve as a pretext for starving him of the resources he needs
to fully explore potential errors. This proposed reform is
designed to replicate, as far as possible, the scope of review that
would have been available under the separate-track system. The
crucial difference is that under this scheme, litigation of all
claims now occurs during the inmate's first appeal "as of right."
This means, as a practical matter, that the Fourteenth
Amendment-derived right of effective assistance of counsel
attaches throughout the proceeding, even as to the aspects of the
process that involve the development and litigation of extra-
record claims.22 '
Now, of course, it is immediately apparent that the inmate
does not have any state-court forum for the litigation of any
appellate-ineffectiveness claims. This flaw has induced some
unitary states, such as Ohio and Colorado, to enact special
procedures to permit the exhaustion of such claims in state court
proceedings.22 If a state decides to combine its appeals without
providing such a "safety valve," however, what will actually
happen is that appellate-ineffectiveness issues will be litigated in
federal court.
Let us assume that an unfortunate inmate receives poor
legal assistance during his state-court combined-track appeal. He
then acquires new counsel in federal habeas proceedings. That
counsel determines that there are meritorious claims or issues
that were not adequately developed in state court owing to poor
performance by combined-track counsel. New counsel will
plead these unexhausted claims in her federal habeas petition.
The state will then surely respond that these claims are
221. Of course, it is possible that a skeptical federal court might decide to inspect each
particular claim, determine whether it involves extra-record litigation, and selectively deny
any constitutional guarantee of effective performance as to those aspects of the direct
appeal that dealt with the litigation of extra-record claims. But this seems unlikely, as it (1)
involves intense scrutiny of the direct appeal process and (2) does not find any support in
existing Supreme Court jurisprudence, which declines to attach effectiveness guarantees to
post-conviction representation for reasons unrelated to the extra-record nature of most post-
conviction claims.
222. Colorado, which has a "function[ally]" unitary review scheme, avoids the
deprivation of a state-court forum for appellate ineffectiveness claims by permitting such
claims to be raised specially by petition to the Colorado Supreme Court. Kappler, supra
n. 163, at 528. Ohio provides a separate forum for attacking appellate counsel's
performance after the direct appeal has been resolved. See Ohio R. App. Proc. 26(B).
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technically exhausted, but procedurally defaulted. That is, the
defendant flouted the rules of the state court forum by failing to
advance all claims during the combined-track appeal. Yet he
cannot return to state court and exhaust the claims, because, in
all likelihood, he is forbidden from filing a successive habeasS 223
corpus application by state-court successor bars.
In this situation, the petitioner's new federal habeas counsel
has an effective rejoinder. Ineffective assistance of counsel can
provide "cause" to excuse the failure to adhere to the state's
procedural rules. 24 Of course, as Coleman v. Thompson225
teaches, ineffective assistance of counsel can only provide cause
when it constitutes an independent violation of the inmate's
federal constitutional right to effective counsel.21' And, of
course, it will only constitute such a violation when it occurs at a
phase of the proceedings to which the effective assistance
guarantee attaches. 27  Under the combined-track appeal,
however, the effective assistance guarantee will indeed attach.
Any deficient performance during the combined-track direct
appeal will constitute an independent violation of the inmate's
Fourteenth Amendment right to effective appellate counsel.
28
The federal court will be empowered to review the underlying
claim and, assuming it finds prejudice, to grant the writ of
habeas corpus as to meritorious claims overlooked by
incompetent appellate counsel.
What about Edwards v. Carpenter?2 9 In Edwards, the
Supreme Court held that a federal court could enforce a federal
procedural default against a claim of ineffective assistance of
223. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996) (noting existence of procedural
default in such a situation).
224. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1986).
225. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
226. Murray, 501 U.S. at 754.
227. Id. (distinguishing between ineffective assistance of counsel that occurs during the
direct-appeal phase of the proceedings, during which the State "must bear the cost" of
attorney defaults that constitute violations of the defendant's right to counsel, and post-
conviction proceedings, during which the "State has no responsibility to ensure that
petitioner was represented by competent counsel" ).
228. See e.g. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 276 (2000) (noting existence of right to
effective assistance of counsel in inmate's first appeal "as of right" from his conviction,
and tracing provenance of right to "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and ... the Due Process Clause of [the Fourteenth] Amendment")
229. 529 U.S. 446 (2000).
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counsel that the inmate intended to use to excuse a preceding
procedural default as to a particular substantive claim.230
Translated into more approachable prose, Edwards deals with
the following situation. In state court, your incompetent lawyer
fails to properly present a meritorious constitutional challenge to
your conviction or sentence (we will call it Claim A) to the state
court. You wish to assert that your lawyer performed
ineffectively when he failed to advance Claim A. This fresh
argument, in turn, is your ineffective assistance of counsel claim
(Claim B), which you intend to use in federal court to excuse the
procedural default caused by your incompetent lawyer's failure
to properly present Claim A. Must you, in turn, exhaust Claim B
in the state courts? That is, must you, at some point in the state
appellate process, raise Claim B-your incompetent lawyer's
failure to properly raise Claim A-in order to preserve your
ability to use Claim B to obtain a merits determination of Claim
A in the federal courts?
Citing "comity and federalism," the Edwards Court
answered, "Yes." 23' Edwards, of course, means that the
combined-track scheme would deprive inmates of any chance to
exhaust their appellate-ineffectiveness claims in state court. That
is, there would be no "appeal after the appeal" of the type
provided in most full-guarantee states, during which inmates
would be able to raise claims that their previous appellate
lawyers had performed ineffectively. This fact is a by-product of
the procedural streamlining that, in fact, is one of the selling
points of the combined-track scheme. Under Edwards, it would
seem that federal review of any appellate-ineffectiveness
complaints is barred, given that they cannot be exhausted in
state court.
However, once again the petitioner has a response
grounded in existing habeas jurisprudence. The federal habeas
statute provides that exhaustion of a claim is excused if
"circumstances exist that render [the state's corrective] process
ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant." 23 2 As we have
seen above, at least one federal circuit court has definitively
rejected any reading of this provision that might serve as a
230. Id. at 452-53.
231. Id. at 453.
232. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2002) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
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pretext to regulate the quality of the work an appointed post-
conviction lawyer did in an available state forum.233 However,
when there is no forum at all in which a lawyer or inmate may
exhaust such a claim, the situation is different.
A Ninth Circuit capital habeas case, Hoffman v. Arave,234
illustrates how a federal court will likely respond to this
procedural conundrum. Hoffman is of special interest because it
addresses a state, Idaho, which already has a combined-track
system, albeit one with glaring procedural shortcomings that
completely rule it out as any sort of model for reform.235 Idaho's
law requires those who have been convicted of capital offenses
to file "any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or
conviction that is known or reasonably should be known" within
forty-two days of the "filing of the judgment imposing the
sentence of death. , 236 Hoffman, still represented by his trial
attorneys, filed his appeal timely in 1989.237 Unsurprisingly, his
trial counsel did not file any claims attacking their own
performance.238 Later, with new counsel, Hoffman filed a second
post-conviction attack raising ineffectiveness challenges. This
second attack was dismissed by the Idaho courts as procedurally
defaulted.239
When Hoffman reached federal court, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court, which had respected the state court's
procedural default of Hoffman's claims. The court first cited a
sister circuit for the proposition that because the right to
effective representation "'lies at the very foundation of the
adversary system of criminal justice,' habeas courts must be
'particularly vigilant in scrutinizing the adequacy of state rules
of procedural default which have the effect of barring federal
habeas review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel."' 
2 40
233. See supra Part II1.B (discussing jurisprudence of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit).
234. 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2001).
235. For a detailed critique of Idaho's unitary system of review in operation, see Joan M.
Fisher, Expedited Review of Capital Post-Conviction Claims: Idaho's Flawed Process, 2 J.
App. Prac. & Process 85 (2000).
236. Idaho Code § 19-2719(3) (West 2003).
237. Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 528.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 529-30 (quoting English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998)).
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The Hoffnan court found that the Idaho rule was "an
unreasonable restriction on the exercise of the federally
protected right to counsel" and was therefore "inadequate to bar
federal review."2 4'
The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion on three principal
grounds. First, the statute did not provide for the automatic
replacement of trial counsel by new counsel, leading to the
unavoidable conflict of interest created by a defendant being
represented by his own trial counsel in the only proceeding
available to him in which to exhaust any claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. 241 "Not surprisingly," the court observed,
"Hoffman's trial counsel failed to raise and argue the issue of
their own ineffectiveness in post-conviction proceedings."
' 243
Second, the Hoffman court also suggested that the extreme
brevity of the forty-two day deadline, which it labeled "uniquely
harsh," might well have rendered the state appellate remedy
inadequate even in the absence of the counsel conflict. Because
Idaho made no provisions for expedited delivery of the trial
transcript to the defendant's lawyers, an inmate's counsel might
be required-as Hoffman's counsel on his initial appeal were-
to prepare the appeal without access to the printed transcript of
the case.2" Finally, the court held, even if the transcript had been
available, the forty-two day deadline would likely have rendered
the remedy ineffective. Proper representation of a capital
defendant during a post-conviction proceeding requires more
than a mere review of the record-it requires "the opportunity
to conduct an investigation beyond the court records to uncover
possible omissions made by trial counsel in the investigation and
presentation of the case." 
2 45
Hoffrnan suggests what a federal court would do in a
combined-track state. Even assuming the federal court initially
recognized the state-court procedural default (stemming from
241. Id. at 530 (citing Michel v. La., 350 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1955)).
242. Id. at 532-34. The Ninth Circuit noted that following Hoffman's appeal the Idaho
Supreme Court and Idaho Legislature had amended the rules governing capital appeals to
advise the defendant of his right to have new counsel on appeal, and to require that at least
one attorney other than trial counsel be appointed to represent a defendant during his
appeal. Id. at 534.
243. Id,
244. Id. at 535.
245. Id.
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the fact that the petitioner had not exhausted his appellate-
ineffectiveness claims in state court), the court would surely
excuse the default (or excuse the exhaustion requirement itself)
by finding that the state had not provided any adequate forum
for the resolution of the claim. After all, the Hoffman court
excused -a defendant from exhausting his ineffectiveness claims
because his trial counsel could not be expected to challenge his
own performance in a subsequent phase of the proceeding. In
the combined-track scenario, a capital defendant's appellate
lawyer's only chance to exhaust appellate counsel would be to
file ineffectiveness claims against himself in the very same
appellate proceeding. It is difficult indeed to imagine a federal
court willing to recognize such a forum as adequate, although,
unfortunately, the possibility cannot be ruled out. But the
likelihood seems so remote that the potential problem posed by
Edwards, I submit, can be viewed as less serious than
anticipated.246
3. A Caveat and an Argument
Once again, it bears repeating that the combined-track
proposal is an emergency triage solution designed for states that
currently have grave problems with their post-conviction
schemes and a political climate actively hostile to any reform
that could be portrayed as prolonging death penalty appeals.
That such states exist cannot be doubted. And that the problem
is urgent also cannot be doubted: The states with the crudest and
most problem-plagued capital post-conviction systems-such as
Texas, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida-are precisely those
246. The federal courts would be justified in finding that a state which adopted a
combined-track scheme with no safety valve to permit review of appellate ineffectiveness
claims was knowingly waiving the right, conferred by Edwards, to initial review of such
claims. The situation can be analogized to the state courts' reactions to O'Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). In O'Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that state inmates
must present their constitutional claims to the state's highest court during discretionary
review in order to exhaust them for federal habeas purposes. Id. at 845. To blunt criticism
that O'Sullivan's holding would undermine state supreme courts' discretionary review
procedures, Justice Souter, in a separate opinion, "anticipated-indeed invited" the states
to alter their appellate-procedure rules to provide that presentation of a claim during direct
appeal to an intermediate court sufficed to exhaust the claim. Abdur'Rahman v. Bell, 537
U.S. 88, 90 n. 3 (2002) (citing O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 849-850) (Souter, J., dissenting from
dismissal of certiorari).
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states with the largest and most active death rows. Texas has
carried out more executions than any other state, and Alabama
sentences more defendants to death, per capita, than any other
state."7
Obviously, the most effective remedy to this problem
would be the recognition of a federal constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel or, at least. a federal
jurisprudence that makes possible some sort of meaningful
control and oversight over the adequacy of state post-conviction
forums. I have argued elsewhere that neither of these appears to
be on the horizon2 48 and that certainly neither will be
forthcoming in time to ensure quality representation for recently
sentenced inmates.
While federal courts have shown very little interest in
systemic policing of the overall adequacy of state post-
conviction forums, they have shown themselves willing to
police the fairness of individual convictions. My approach
accepts the current federal climate as a given and leverages
existing precedent and the continued willingness of the federal
judiciary to spot-check individual cases by (1) broadening the
scope of individual review to include at least a meaningful
chance of review of claims defaulted by the incompetence of
state-court appellate counsel and (2) freeing the federal court of
any obligation to articulate systemic critiques in order to remedy
injustices in individual cases (as is generally necessary under
more systemic arguments).
The other constraint my proposal takes into the account is
the necessity of convincing skeptical or reluctant state legislators
to reform their current post-conviction schemes. This is, in my
view, a necessary part of any pragmatic solution. The federalist
cat is out of the bag: State legislators, officials and courts know
that, in the foreseeable future, there is almost no chance of
successful federal challenges to the constitutionality of their
state post-conviction schemes. They know, in short, that they
have a completely free hand to structure their state capital post-
conviction systems as they wish and to honor state-level policies
247. See Post, supra n. 156 (noting that Alabama's death row housed 194 people as of
December 1, 2003, and that Alabama had, since 1998, sentenced more people to death per
capita than any other state).
248. See Hammel, supra n. 95, at 55-61.
EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE GUARANTEES FOR COUNSEL
without fear of federal interference. My proposal is designed to
accommodate one of the most prominent such policies: the
desire to keep delays between imposition and execution of
sentence under control.
I . The key selling point of the combined-track appeal is that
state-level politicians will be able accurately to portray the plan
as streamlining death-penalty appeals: "We are collapsing two
redundant, time-consuming levels of appeals into one, but we
will still allow prisoners a full opportunity to challenge the
fairness of their trials." There can be little doubt that in states
that currently have sequential direct appeal and post-conviction
procedures, the combined-track approach will shorten the state
appellate process. Even if the appointed combined-track counsel
were given an appropriate amount of time in which to prepare
and file their catch-all appeal (at least two years), that span of
time would likely end up being no longer than the amount of
time needed for two separate sequential appeals.
Further, a state court might well be able to make more
efficient docket-management decisions with all the relevant
facts-both record-based and extra-record-before it at once.
For instance, a state court that was on the brink of granting relief
on a record-based claim of prosecutorial misconduct (based, for
instance, on a prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure
to testify or inflammatory closing argument) could allow the
presence of a compelling Brady allegation to tip the scales in
favor of relief. "Even though the record-based misconduct
might not be enough on its own to merit a grant of relief," a
court might reason, "a full picture of the case persuades us that
there were serious problems with this case stemming from
several independent sources. Better to reverse the case now and
send it back for a new trial than spend several extra years in
hearings and appeals needed to confirm the inevitable
conclusion-that this trial was too flawed to uphold."
The extra-record factual development could also,
conversely, clarify to the court that a claim lacks merit. A court
that was concerned about a defense attorney's lackluster
argument at the punishment phase of the trial would clearly gain
insight in to the quality of the defense attorney's preparation by
the extra-record portions of the petition. If they revealed
substantial additional evidence never investigated by trial
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counsel, a hearing would be in order. But if they revealed little
or no additional evidence, the court might well be justified in
concluding that the trial counsel in all likelihood performed a
competent investigation and was simply not left with any
defense theme more viable than the one he used.
As should be apparent from Hoffman, the combined-track
appeal may, in some states, shift the burden of adjudication
toward the federal courts. Federal courts will have to evaluate de
novo all claims of appellate ineffectiveness that the defendant
intends to use to excuse any procedural defaults caused by
failure to properly litigate his claims in state court. And, to the
extent that those cause arguments are successful, the federal
court will have to develop and decide all claims overlooked in
state court.
This will take time and resources. But the amount of
adjudicatory responsibility thrust on the federal courts will be
roughly proportionate to the quality of the representation in state
courts. Appeals handled by qualified counsel with adequate time
and resources should, in the ordinary course of events, generate
more streamlined federal proceedings. The worse lawyers the
state court appoints, and the fewer resources these lawyers are
given, then the more time the federal court will have to expend
making up for the state-court mistakes. This will build in a
much-needed institutional incentive for federal courts to urge
state courts to improve their post-conviction forums.
Currently, many federal courts display no discernible
concern about the quality of the post-conviction process
afforded death row prisoners. In a recent notorious case, the
Fifth Circuit accorded AEDPA deference to the fact findings
and legal conclusions of a Texas post-conviction judge who
entered an order denying a Texas death-row inmate post-
conviction relief-even though the judge had not presided over
the defendant's trial, had never read the transcript of the trial,
and in fact had even lost several of the extra-record exhibits that
the petitioner had filed with his petition.14' A dissenter
commented that the majority's decision "ignores the delicate
balance struck by the Supreme Court among competing
concerns of federalism, due process, Article III jurisdiction,
249. Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 944-46, 954-57 (5th Cir. 2001).
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faithfulness to Congressional enactments, and the importance of
the Great Writ to our legal tradition."25 o Nevertheless, both the
panel and the en banc court denied rehearing.
25'
Such a court is unlikely to display any interest in the
quality of a state's post-conviction forum out of
conscientiousness or statesmanship-but it might do so out of
concern for its docket.
VI. CONCLUSION
The creation of a combined-track remedy is not suitable in
every state. The states that are the real focus of the combined-
track proposal are the states, mostly in the Deep South, that have
large and active death rows and that have historically shown less
than single-minded concern for the provision of adequate
counsel to condemned inmates. These states are the focus of this
proposal for two reasons. First, the political climate in these
states will make them receptive only to reform proposals that
can be sold as significantly streamlining the death-penalty
appeals process. Second, only in these states will the benefits to
be gained by a reform that extends the effective-counsel
guarantee to the entire state appellate process outweigh any
losses. That is, the proposal appears to be a lesser of two evils in
states where (1) incompetent post-conviction representation is
widespread; (2) no court, state or federal, will provide any
remedy for it; and therefore, (3) significant numbers of
condemned inmates are meeting their deaths without any
meaningful review at all.
The combined track is also meant to be a temporary
measure, designed to bring a well-deserved end to the
disgraceful spectacle of federal courts allowing inexperienced or
negligent lawyers to rob their clients of the careful and thorough
post-conviction review which those very courts have frequently
labeled an indispensable component of fair procedure. One can
only hope that those who control the process will soon come to
their collective senses and that legal minds will be freed from
250. Id. at 973 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
251. See Valdez v. Cockrell, 287 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2001) (denying panel rehearing); 288
F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 2001) (denying en banc rehearing).
408 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
the burden of conceiving remedies for this absurd and sorry state
of affairs.
